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Anti-austerity movements and political alternative in Portugal

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Introduction

Austerity became a dominant word in Portuguese society at least from the end of 2010. In fact, by 29 September 2010, the former socialist Prime Minister, José Sócrates, announced that pay cuts of between 3.5 per cent and 10 per cent would affect civil servants earning more than €1,500 a month. This decision (applied since January 2011) was part of the “Stability and Growth Programme 3” (PEC 3) and followed other previous measures taken by the Portuguese Government, namely: “PEC 1” (March, 2010), mainly supported by measures to contain expenditure and increase revenue; and “PEC 2” (May, 2010) aimed at additional measures for budget consolidation. Meanwhile, in the same vein of PEC 3, on 11 March 2011 an additional austerity package (PEC 4) was announced. However, it was rejected days later in the Parliament by all the parties in opposition. Consequently, the Socialist Prime Minister resigned and a right-wing coalition (Social Democratic Party, PSD, and Christian Democratic, CDS) came to power and ruled the country from June 2011 to October 2015. In short, this coalition was primarily responsible for implementing the austerity measures.

The year of 2011 unveiled a protest cycle that unfolded until 2013. The context was one of acute crisis in various domains and fostered harsh opposition against austerity supporters, prompting divisions among political elites regarding solutions. Social movements were organised in response to the oppressive dynamics of austerity measures of Troika (comprising the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission) in the overall context of neo-liberalism (Costa and Estanque 2017). The austerity measures resulting from the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with the Troika in May 2011, and the subsequent amendments to the employment law, raised controversial issues, such as greater flexibility in the labour market, the devaluation of wages, an increase in working hours (Costa 2012) and a general process of income transfer from labour to capital (Leite et al. 2014).

The cycle of anti-austerity contention between 2010 and 2013 in Portugal reveals a complex picture, where traditional actors, including trade unions and left-wing political parties, emerged as key actors. This gave rise to a period of intense polemics in the political arena, since the former right-wing majority
refused to accept a new Prime Minister (António Costa, the leader of the Socialist Party) who “lost” elections in late 2015. However, a “defeated” leader achieved power and was able to draw the “squared of the circle”, negotiating and forging agreements among the divided forces of the Left. This government solution, because of its supposed fragility and lack of consistency, became known as the “Contraporta” (“Geringonça”, in Portuguese). But more than a year later it still resisted and could even avoid some difficult obstacles.

Austerity, crisis and social protests

According to Dagnino (1998), it can be said that those collective actors fought for the right to participate in the definition of the very system they acted upon. In that context, social movement protests tried to keep their distance from partisan logics in order to maintain neutrality that would grant them a broader character. In that light, one can ask if they have succeeded in keeping the distance just mentioned. How did anti-austerity social movement organisations (SMOs) interact with those traditional political actors? Were they immune to any influence whatsoever? Were they safe from co-optation and instrumentalisation?

If austerity struggles have become the unifying “big issue” that created greater synergies between the trade union movement and other groups or socio-occupational movements (Costa and Estanque 2017), they also set the groundwork for interaction dynamics between those protests and political parties. Having as an empirical background the 2011–2013 protest cycle in Portugal, our goal is to elaborate on this contentious matter. We will begin by clarifying the existing connection between austerity, crisis and political participation, followed by a more incisive approach of the relationship between social movements and democracy in times of austerity. In the fourth and following sections, we embrace a contentious debate within which political parties, trade unions and social movements enter into dialogue and bring about a new political alternative.

Especially in southern Europe, the driving factor for participation in demonstrations was dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Campos Lima and Martín Artiles 2013). Such dissatisfaction was associated with changes observed in Portugal after 2011. The labour market has been the area most affected by extremely violent austerity policies, evident in high unemployment rates (mainly among young people), salary and pension cuts, blockage of professional careers, proliferation of precarious forms of work, dismissals, and the reduction of trade union and collective bargaining power, among other things (Estanque and Costa 2012, 2014). The origins of these new trends can be traced back to the end of Fordism and of the thirty glorious years. The precarious condition that marks the twenty-first century was fostered by a profound reconfiguration of working conditions. The fallacy of the promise of “meritocracy”-based, working-class “upward mobility”, with considerable impacts in the socio-political arena has become evident. Besides the “traditional” working class, social struggles of the 20th and 21st centuries encompass the “beneficiaries” of the welfare state, including new socio-professional categories (teachers, doctors,
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civil service officials, etc.). A scenario of that kind amplified the probability of protests in general.

Since the end of 2010, with the onset of austerity, there has been a new intensification of forms of social protest and strike activity (Costa et al. 2014; Costa and Estanque 2017). Trade unions were extremely active and resorted to various forms of action. Between 2010 and 2012, there were 384 strikes in Portugal involving about 224,500 workers. General strikes gained relevance as a type of strike that mobilises the whole of society. There were five general strikes in Portugal in the period 2010–2013. Three of them were combined actions, uniting the two main trade union confederations – General Confederation of Portuguese Workers or Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTP) and General Workers’ Union or União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT) – against austerity policies (24 November 2010, 24 November 2011 and 27 June 2013). On the other hand, the other two general strikes were called by only CGTP (one was held on 22 March 2012 and the other on 14 November 2012), also against the austerity of the government and the Troika. In general, public discontent peaked during the rescue programme, signed by the three traditional ruling political parties – PS (Socialist Party), PSD (Social Democratic Party) and CDS (Christian Democrats/right-wing), which imposed an “austerity society” model on the Portuguese (Ferreira 2012).

Thus, austerity’s significance is not only economical. When we speak of austerity and crisis, it is legitimate to think that we are facing something that, more than defined by economic and financial criteria, results from an “imminently political” act (Santos 2012, 11) that produces impacts on different areas: inequalities, middle-class impoverishment, unemployment, indebtedness of the families or providence society (Santos 2012, 59; Estanque 2012). Moreover, in this sense, austerity constitutes “a form of political economy of a regressive nature” (Observatory on Crises and Alternatives 2014, 313), which incorporates changes in social relations and redefines the central place of work in the economy as well as the traditional role of the welfare state (Estanque 2013; Hespanha et al. 2014).

Consequently, austerity is intricately connected with democracy and, it can be said, its erosion. Portuguese anti-austerity movements were part of a transnational protest cycle in which democracy was a contentious issue in the sense that efforts were made to re-signify notions like citizenship, political representation and participation, or to counteract the refusal of economic democracy by impositions of financial markets under the form of technocratic governance. Through their renewed conceptions of direct and participatory democracy, those collective actors forged a potential resistance against the corrosion of democracy in the last couple of decades. Those trends aroused indignation in a general way, especially since the turn of the century. Austerity and the idea of inevitability were fostered not only by national political actors but also, and with great intensity, by international institutions, making space for an intense debate about the (non)democratic nature of the Portuguese bailout process. Constraints imposed by the MoU were regarded as non-democratic, namely by the CGTP and UGT (by the way, traditional actors of labour market were directly targeted
by the MoU) despite the difference in tone between CGTP and UGT. In that context, the efficiency of parliamentary representative democracy was widely questioned. Claims focused on opening the political decision-making process but also the “rehabilitation” of the “political class” through the contribution and action of left-wing parties and social movements.

A context like this is not the most favourable for political parties in terms of public opinion. In fact, public image of political parties was “damaged” overall as there was the perception that they were either powerless or compliant with regard to the imposition of austerity. In that sense, reasons to protest sprung from dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy (in connection to wealth, welfare and increasing employment) associated with disaffection towards political parties as well as democratic institutions in a general sense. Although economic and social grievances played an important role, mobilisation and social protest were also an expression of meta-political motivation (Campos Lima and Martín Artiles 2013). Citizens were not at all satisfied with the responses of the political system to the economic and social problems.

According to the European Social Survey’s (ESS) data for 2012, Portugal registered one of the largest increases regarding the percentage of people who reported participating in at least one demonstration between 2008 and 2012. Conversely, it is also one with low levels of participation and associative affiliation and where confidence in the party and parliamentary system and in democracy in general also tends to be lower. Findings point to discontent with the performance of the economy and the working of democracy as a contributory factor accounting for mobilisation in Europe; this discontent was highest among young people and those with university education (Campos Lima and Martín Artiles 2013). A correlation seems to exist between people’s position on the Right/Left political spectrum and their participation in mobilisations. Youths’ claims tend to be channelled through social movements and not through parties or trade unions. A strong sense of “democratic disaffection” has been reported, representative of the distance of Portuguese citizens from political institutions, expressed in low levels of political participation and engagement, conventional (as participation in elections) and otherwise (alternative forms of civic activism) (Magalhães 2005). This gradual erosion of the weight and role of traditional forms of political participation has been punctuated by periods of intense mobilisation (Accornero and Pinto 2015). Especially from 2011 onwards, democratic disaffection played an important role in the unfolding of the protest cycle, increasing political activism and engagement amongst the Portuguese citizenry.

Social movements and democracy in times of austerity

The period at stake was a phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system, marked by a rapid diffusion of collective action from a more mobilised to a less mobilised sector, amongst other things. This description corresponds to the definition of protest cycle (Tarrow 1995, 1998). Other characteristics, also present in the Portuguese case, are the geographical spread of conflict,
emergence of non-organisational actions and of new groups/organisations, innovation in the repertoires of action, and the elaboration of new cognitive, cultural and ideological frames. It is worth saying that, despite levels of participation attained throughout the protest cycle, in the second half of 2013 and beyond there has been a cooling down of the frequency and intensity of protests. SMOs and "cyber platforms" expressed an acute discontent focused, in part, on the perception that traditional politics (typically represented by organisations like political parties and trade unions) were excessively bureaucratised (Estanque et al. 2015), and this, in association with other factors, precluded a true expression of citizens’ claims and will. That being so, and as pinpointed by Campos Lima and Martín Artiles (2013), most of the recent social movements operate very much in the periphery of political and trade union organisations.

On a global scale, the various events and waves of protest in recent years share some common characteristics in that they are inspired by sections of educated youth, communicated through cyberspace, organised flexibly over networks, without identifiable leaders or centres, and spontaneous in nature. Such decentralisation increases participation and reduces vulnerability to repression, without calling into question coordination and deliberative functions. Media exposure – especially the role of cyberspace – means that the images and the drama of crowds in revolt, or the collective celebration of a victorious outcome, might trigger a copycat effect that could rapidly spread whenever the specificities of the local context prove favourable. Social movements and their organisations here at stake are considered to be network social movements that express, as proposed by Manuel Castells (2013), revolts and personal projects anchored in multi-dimensional experiences. They respond to an emotional mobilisation unchained by indignation before injustice, which can also be seen as a heterogeneous rebellion under the influence of a middle-class drive (Estanque 2015).

Manuel Castells also highlighted network social movements’ capacity to generate new spaces of autonomy through their action. They are viral, reflexive in nature, non-violent by principle, embrace many different claims, and seek value change. Other features worth emphasising are the transnational nature of many of the established networks and the combination of material, political and identity-based demands. They seem to materialise autonomous organisation strategies from civil society regarding the State – a sign of civil society re-emergence (Cohen and Arato 2000).

The democratic issue attained great relevance during this protest cycle. Institutional democracy and democratic values tend to come under attack in periods of conflict and crisis. In the recent social context in Southern Europe, it should be noted that the formation of the wave of protests was intimately connected with a "return to materialism", especially concerning work and employment rights (Estanque et al. 2013; Costa and Estanque 2017; Quaranta 2016). Such a return would be in line with Boltanski and Chiapello’s social critique, the same critique identified in “old” social movements (Boltanski and Chiapello 2001). However, following the authors just mentioned, an artistic (or cultural) critique linked to the “new” social movements is also present, especially considering the
presence of identity issues, the trans-class composition as well as the large presence of youth in these mass demonstrations. Thus, we need to focus our attention on the old tension between labour struggles issued from the sphere of production, on the one side, and most of the "new" social movements, connecting struggles of identity, culture or "post-materialism", on the other (Costa and Estanque 2017).

In any case, it is important to highlight that the (old) theories of the so-called New Social Movements (NSMs) are probably insufficient for an accurate account of recent movements of protest and social rebellion. Network social movements are less exposed to co-optation by political parties, even though the latter can capitalise on the public opinion changes produced by them (Castells 2013). Despite their engagement in political debate, they neither create new political parties nor support governments, albeit, as discussed later on, in light of the Portuguese context, such reasoning does not hold.

Even if the issue of autonomy is a central one, social movement strategy and politics are always constrained by their internal dynamics and interaction with formal politics (Kriesi et al. 1995). Zald and Ash have defined social movements as "a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions and structures" (Zald and Ash 1966, 329). For them, the organisations through which social movements can manifest themselves differ from bureaucratic organisations in two ways: they are aimed at changing society and its members; and wish to restructure society or individuals, not to provide it or them with regular service. Goals aimed at change subject movement organisations to vicissitudes which many other types of organisation avoid. In spite of the fact that contemporary social movements act on and compose new organisational contexts, social movement organisations are by no means insulated from the outside world. They exist within political, economic and social contexts, and deal themselves with a dynamic internal context.

The Left, radicalism and the search for "alternative"

The life cycle, strategies and organisational forms of social movements are influenced by internal and external contexts (Zald and Ash 1966). The consolidation of a precarious society and the austerity regime (Soeiro 2015) made up the external context in which social movements were shaped, and influenced the options for certain strategies. Those options were also influenced by institutional attitudes towards the new collective actors. Formal political actors’ reactions to movement actors’ claims were a key factor. Social movement success is thought to go hand in hand with a decrease in autonomy (Zald and Ash 1966), and that, alongside the incorporation of some of their claims by political parties, can mean a greater interest for more conventional forms of doing politics.

The search for an alternative has been at the core of protests and, in recent decades, the question of an alternative has acquired a new meaning given that the future is not what is at stake (Estanque 2015). Conversely, as suggested by Arcary (2013), those who protest focus on the rejection of a humiliating past or a degrading present.
The rejection of past and present entails possibilities of change. The notion that “it can’t possibly get any worse” may turn out to have a mobilising effect. Constructing an alternative requires a profound transformation (Eagleton 2003). In that sense, one should be aware of the difference between a reformist and a revolutionary period: whereas in the first case global revolution remains a dream and attempts are limited to change things locally; in a revolutionary period, radical global change is necessary for something to change at all (Žižek 2013). The social uprisings under analysis here are not revolutions in the sense described by Žižek, although in some cases, as in the so-called “Arab Spring”, radical changes did occur. Their characteristics do not point to the presence of a “revolutionary” potential, beside the fact that they put pressure on governments and institutions (Estanque 2015).

The concerns of the left and those of NSMs are, according to Kriesi et al. (1995), closely related. In particular, “new” left political parties normally appeal to the same constituency as NSMs, pursue the same goals to a large extent, and resort to forms of political action close to those of NSM. On the other hand, according to the authors just mentioned, both NSMS mobilisation capacity and political success are expected to depend closely on the support they receive from the organisations of the left. Two aspects in particular should be taken into account: the configuration of power on the left and the presence or absence of the left in government.

Considering these theoretical lines, we shall look at the current trends of growing precariousness as well as the large fragmentation and metamorphosis of work. Given these transformations we think it could a logical statement to believe in a progressive process of proximity between traditional labour struggles and the new battles of the “brand new social movements” who are, to a large extent, related to economic and employment problems. In fact, this is one of the ambivalent dynamics in the recent cycle of demonstrations in the Portuguese case. Therefore, we will try to show some lines of that relationship composed by a complex mixture of tensions, complicities and contradictions.

Similarly to other parts of the world, Portugal came face to face with a wave of protests marked by the sense of indignation in 2011. According to Ortiz et al. (2013), the global protests of recent years seem to unveil a lack of strategic direction, leadership and ideological reinvention, focusing on an alternative, (un) wittingly vague and distant. Protest agendas as well as modes of organisation and action stand out for being quite divorced from traditional political participation in most cases. In fact, protests between 2011 and 2013 entailed a political critique of the social and political order, challenged it, calling for new and radical forms of democracy.

**Anti-austerity movements and political parties**

The support of the old Left for NSMs can happen in situations where the latter bring forth issues that also mobilise their traditional social bases. A militant old Left is willing to support NSMs only on its own terms. In other words, an
alliance with NSMs could be interesting as long as those movements' concerns were reformulating the "old" working class struggles but still focussed on employment rights and rejecting precariousness. When the "old" left faced competition from "new" left parties, the chances of the former becoming closer to the NSMs, and inorganic protests, increase. In general, the presence of New Left parties is thought to play an important facilitating role concerning NSMs' campaigns.

New alliances between political parties and NSMs increase when the Left is in the opposition because the former will benefit from their challenges to the government, especially when those challenges are moderate and considered legitimate by a large part of the electorate. When becoming part of the government, the left is limited by institutional politics and pressures from dominant social forces, and will make compromises regarding their electoral promises.\textsuperscript{13} In such cases, in spite of being possible, cooperation is a remote possibility because there is always the risk of NSMs' action getting out of control. It is worth mentioning that the relationship between the left and NSMs can vary according to the type of social movement. Also, the degree to which changes in the composition of government will affect the opportunities for NSMs will vary according to the strength of the state, the exclusiveness of elite strategies, and the details of the composition of the government.

In the case of Portugal, the claim for autonomy was a core value of anti-austerity movements, namely in relation to political parties and other (vested) interests. It was envisaged as a cornerstone in the construction of an alternative project, with citizens as the prime actors of that construction. They were to gain an active voice in political decisions, which were no longer only left to political parties and governments. That meant that social movements attempted to exclude parties from the battles they were leading. Adopting a partisan stance was a contentious issue inside "social movement organisations" throughout the entire protest cycle. It was contentious in a number of ways and constrained further developments until a certain point. Moreover, such a principle was difficult to sustain given the nature of claims at stake. In spite of the autonomy mentioned, left-wing political parties, as well as trade unions, turned out to be key actors in that context, facilitating and sustaining the discontinuous mobilisation of new forms of activism, while seeking to gain access to new constituencies through them. On the other hand, it can be argued that a nonpartisan stance was a sort of asset that allowed bringing new supporters to the "anti-austerity cause". At the same time that the new actors displayed major weaknesses, they also faced important challenges, due to the strained relationship they retained with the older social movements (trade unions and political parties), with that difficulty attributed to the absence of new ideological reference points around which to mobilise (Costa and Estanque 2017). In that sense, the initial general picture can be somewhat paradoxical. Nevertheless, in the context of austerity, connections between social movements and political parties became altogether clearer.

The first protest of this cycle, the Desperate Generation (\textit{Geração À Rasca}),\textsuperscript{14} was presented as ostensibly non-partisan, even anti-political in the sense of a
rejection of established political parties. It took place on 12 March 2011, shortly after the presentation of the Stability and Growth Pact IV (the already quoted “PEC 4") by the Socialist government, setting the emergence of the anti-austerity movement in Portugal. Harsh new measures were being prepared, such as revising the labour law and new taxes. Discontent was displayed in the streets based on concrete deprivation experiences and degradation of life conditions and expectations. It was a “protest of a generation against the imposition of labour precariousness” that evidenced the prevalence of “carousel trajectories” (Diogo 2012), characterised by disqualifying integration experiences (Paugam 2000) and permeated by risk and insecurity among youths. Demands were articulated with issues related to representative democracy, its quality and of the political class altogether. The call for protest expressed dissatisfaction with three specific domains: political class, government politics and absence of future perspectives.

It has been said that chances of alliances between political parties and NSMs increase when the Left is in the opposition, as it can benefit from NSMs’ challenges to the government (especially when moderate and considered legitimate by a large part of the electorate). Albeit being in opposition, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCP) tried to keep their distance from the new collective actors. Taken as representatives of the “old” Left, both were utterly puzzled by the enormous mobilisation produced without political parties’ or trade unions’ support. They praised collective action, acknowledged the claims and were sympathetic as they were in line with their own. Despite all that, their reactions were of distrust given the belief that discontent had to be channelled through institutions in order to produce effects. Desperate generation activists, supporters and participants thought otherwise.

In the PCP’s case, reluctance displayed can also be derived from its appointed close relationship with the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP), the most representative trade union confederation (Cerdeira 1997; Estanque 2009; Estanque and Costa 2013; Stoleroff 1988). When it was founded, CGTP established itself as a “class-based, unitary, independent, democratic and mass trade union organisation, which has its roots and its principles in the glorious traditions of organisation and struggle of the working class and of Portuguese workers” (CGTP 2012, 2014). Action by the anti-austerity movements threatened to overshadow that of CGTP. Leaning on Hyman’s typology (2001), it can be said that the confederation is a case of class-based trade unionism. If one bears in mind network social movements’ characteristics mentioned beforehand – horizontal network pattern sustained by the Internet, absence of identifiable centres and formal leaderships, viral, reflexive in nature, and so on – it is not at all surprising that those political parties’ attitudes were suspicious. Our argument is that such attitudes influenced those of PCP and vice-versa, giving the close relationship just mentioned.

A similar kind of argument holds for the Socialist Party’s (PS) case. As highlighted by several authors, the confederation created in 1978 – the UGT – was aimed at counteracting the hegemony that CGTP (close to the PCP) enjoyed in Portuguese society. At its founding, the UGT was supported by the Socialist and
Social Democratic parties (Costa 1994). Assuming the role of the political and ideological rival of the CGTP, the UGT can be envisaged, again according to Hyman (2001), as an example of society-based trade unionism, given that it advocates for social integration and the promotion of social dialogue. In the CGTP case, the communist influence, coming from a party tied to a counterpower strategy, was inductive of a trade unionism of contestation (Estanque et al. 2015). In contrast, the socialist and social-democratic influence over UGT favoured a trade unionism of negotiation (Costa 1994; UGT 2013).

Following the argument partially formulated above and bearing in mind anti-austerity movements’ general stance of clear opposition and less than mild affinity with negotiation, those movements would always be closer to the CGTP than to the UGT. It must be stressed, however, that “tensions” and “distrust” have always been a structural trait between the two fields. Therefore, CGTP’s dominant position concerning the task of defending and promoting labour rights was in some sense threatened (at least in terms of prominence) by new collective actors’ emergence. That being so, a more distant attitude by a PCP closely connected to the confederation was not at all surprising, since it would be in PCP’s interest to preserve the prominence just mentioned. The same reasoning can be applied to UGT’s case, even though the clear choice of negotiation over contestation drove the confederation and anti-austerity movements apart, with the expected effects in what concerns the attitudes of political parties supporting the first.

The case of the Left Bloc (BE) contrasts clearly with the previous. That party was more than simply sympathetic towards the emergent collective actors. It supported the protest in what could be called a “moral” sense. As previously mentioned, New Left political parties appeal to the same constituency as the NSMs, pursue the same goals to a large extent, and resort to forms of political action close to those of NSMs (Kriesi et al. 1995). In that sense, the support granted was not at all surprising given that the BE can be identified with a “new” left in some sense. That party has always claimed for itself the status of “the movements’ party”. Moreover, it strongly opposed the cuts introduced by the socialist government in office and embraced the struggle against labour precariousness, presenting a history of unofficial involvement with a social movement organisation called “Inflexible Precarious”. It can be argued that by supporting the emergent collective actors, the BE was trying to expand its sphere of influence. In what can be an excessively straightforward formulation, if the PCP “had” CGTP, the BE would “have” anti-austerity movements.

Moments of a protest cycle

On 12 March, 2011, such dissatisfaction was clearly evident in the most popular slogans heard in Lisbon and Porto:

“If they want precarious workers, they’ll get rebels!”; “We want our lives back!”; “Salary theft!”; “The country is going to the dogs!”; “Enough of
This huge demonstration brought 300,000 people into the streets of the two main Portuguese cities (about 200,000 in Lisbon and 100,000 in Porto), and was the largest social protest in Portugal since the “Carnation Revolution” of 25 April 1974 (Campos Lima and Martín Artilles 2013, 357). It can be envisaged as a turning point in that trade unions ceased to have the monopoly on social and industrial action, which is perhaps why it briefly became the subject of public debate. This first protest is thought to have had both direct and indirect impacts. Soon afterwards, in May, the Indignados and the Acampadas of Democracia Real Já, in Madrid, Spain, transmitted a similar message and invoked the Portuguese example (Velasco 2011, cited in Costa and Estanque 2017), followed by the global wave of protest around the Occupy Wall Street movement, centred on New York, but with global repercussions (Vradis and Dalkakoglou 2011; Harvey 2012; Baumgarten 2013).

In a similar way to most demonstrations and socio-political protest networks, the Desperate Generation protest was defensive in nature. The truth is that those who rebelled might be aware of what they did not want, but they did not know exactly what they did want. Despite the large mobilisation produced, both the protest call and organisation process were not mediated by any organisation. In that sense, it was spontaneous, which raised particular reactions from political actors. In a general way, it was considered a “healthy demonstration from civil society”, in the sense that democracy allows expressions of discontent, with those expressions being valuable elements in terms of political agenda configuration. Nevertheless, those “healthy expressions” were further framed in two distinct ways. The coalition in government (centre-right) stuck to the “healthy” character while devaluing those same expressions; Left-wing parties’ reactions were paradoxical.

The 15O protest (on 15 October 2011) – “United for global change” – was the second protest of the cycle and the first after signing the MoU. It was a global protest motivated by generalised indignation, which took place in hundreds of cities around the world. The slogan “Direct Democracy, Now!” was the most emblematic, together with “They don’t represent us” or “We are the 99%”. In a general sense, those slogans expressed indignation towards political leaders and denounced the shortcomings of democracy. The claims voiced radical perspectives that advocated a total rupture with the status quo, in line with the critique of representative democracy and of political actors previously conveyed by the “Desperate Generation”. However, in contrast, the 15O was summoned by organisations linked to the extra-parliamentary radical Left. Together with the claims’ radical nature, that fact aroused the suspicion of both socialists and communists. For those political parties, especially for the PCP, the very conception of political action, organised and driven by political parties, was at stake, or, better said, was being endangered.
The protests “Screw the Troika!” were at the protest cycle’s height. The expression “Screw the Troika” (“Que se lixe a Troika”, Portuguese acronym QSLT) condensed a set of meanings relative to the imposition of societies of austerity (Ferreira 2012) and incorporated several struggles aimed at counteracting that imposition. We had two big mass demonstrations under this slogan.

The first QSLT protest – called “Screw the Troika, we want our lives back!” – took place on 15 September 2012, in a context of economic and political crisis and social unrest. On that date, the announcement of the proposal of the right-wing coalition government to reduce employers’ social security contributions from 23.75 per cent to 18 per cent and, in turn, increase employees’ contributions from 11 per cent to 18 per cent (in what became known as the draft “Single Social Tax”/TSU) triggered harsh reactions. A group of citizens, in its majority linked to activism and previous mobilisations, summoned a new protest via Facebook. About one million people demonstrated angrily in most Portuguese cities, prompting the government to back down and withdraw the proposal.

Demystifying the idea of inevitability and its absolute necessity allowed for rejecting the intervention and exigencies of the Troika and a proactive and combative attitude towards austerity. Austerity politics were after all political and ideological options. Therefore, the appeal to participation was broader and more inclusive than in previous protests. This event, similar to “12 March 2011”, involved socio-occupational actors and also relied on a strong cyber-activist culture, in contrast to what had been standard trade union practice.

The second QSLT protest, mobilised with the motto “Screw the Troika, It is the People who rule the most!”, took place on 2 March 2013, after the approval of the State Budget for 2013, which foresaw salary cuts and a drastic reduction of public expenditure. The context was therefore one of austerity reinforcement. The call for protest was broad and inclusive and conveyed a harsh critique. It was openly against the state reforms and the announcement of €4 billion in cuts to state welfare spending. The tone of indignation, the claims for government dismissal and the rejection of the Troika rose in intensity and were more clearly formulated in comparison with previous protests. The mobilisation was considered a success because it brought to the streets hundreds of thousands of people who demanded a left-wing government.

The idea of unity between all sectors of the population, organised and non-organised and of different struggles, was present in both of the “Screw the Troika” protests. The nonpartisan character was not evoked as a guiding principle. Critical speech towards political parties and trade unions was softened, allowing it to attract other social sectors that had been maintained apart until that moment. As expressed in the second protest manifesto, the goal was to provide a “meeting point for various democratic anti-Troika currents”. So, that was a precarious “unity” based on being “against” but not on prospective grounds. Differently from the previous ones, the second protest was around quite concrete claims: government’s dismissal, expulsion of the Troika and anticipated elections. Participation was massive, up to hundreds of thousands overall, and, together with the enlargement of the social base, confirmed the disintegration of
the consensus around inevitability. However, the government depreciated the
dissatisfaction expressed in the streets.

The “Screw the Troika” protests presented a new character to the protest
cycle. On the one hand, they reversed the fall into despondency after the first
round of protests (the last one had been almost a year before); on the other,
claims acquired demand a character not only more specific but also “more politi-
cal” in conventional terms because they relied clearly on the distinction between
the political Left and Right. Another new element was related to the amplifica-
tion and diversification of support. In the case of the second “Screw the Troika”
protest, the main trade union confederation and some left-wing parties openly
supported the protest. The magnitude reached by the second QSLT protest can in
part be explained by the presence of influential allies (Tarrow 1998). Political
parties represented one of those influential allies (especially the Left Bloc).

If left-wing political parties were the influential allies of anti-austerity move-
ments, those movements were, in turn, important allies in crucial moments, as in
the general strikes mentioned (Fonseca 2016). Between 2011 and 2013, general
strikes benefited from the context provided by anti-austerity protests, which was
quite intense in terms of mobilisation and challenges. The chronological sequence
suggests it: the 24 November 2011 general strike took place after “Desperate Gen-
eration” and 15O protests; the 14 November 2012 general strike was preceded by
the first “Screw the Troika” protest; and the 27 June 2013 strike happened a few
months after the second “Screw the Troika” protest, which was massive. In
general, those protests produced sensitising impacts, that is, they influenced public opinion in what concerns the inevitability of austerity and the potential of
collective action. On the other hand, anti-austerity movements played an important
part in the unfolding of general strikes registered in that period, reinforcing and
expanding both strategies and the scope of the general strikes (Fonseca 2016).
Anti-austerity movements provided, in that sense, opportunities for trade unionism
renewal as new strategies and alliances were put forward, and, by doing so, pro-
duced a new political climate that favoured political change.

Beyond the movements: building the “contraption”

About a year after the last protest, the political landscape changed in Portugal.
The elections on 4 October 2015 ushered in a changed parliamentary scenario
that was indicating a major political shift (Estanque and Costa 2015). After four
years of austerity, the election outcome was contradictory right from the start.
The victory of the right-wing alliance between the Social Democratic Party
(PSD), and the Christian Democratic Centre (CDS), opened up the possibility
for an alliance of the Left, despite the high rate of abstention (44.14 per cent).
The PSD-CDS coalition (in government since 2011) received the highest per-
centage of votes (36.86 per cent), followed by the Socialist Party/PS (32.31 per
cent), the Left Bloc/BE (10.19 per cent) and the Portuguese Communist Party/
PCP (8.25 per cent). Such an electoral outcome, in spite of protest activity men-
tioned above, was the result of a number of factors.
The Government (right-wing) discourse of inevitability fostered by the coalition prevented (or made more difficult) the construction of alternatives. The impression was that the adjustment programme prescribed by Troika was absolutely necessary. Alongside it, there was the “SYRIZA effect”: in Greece, a leftist party came to power but continued with austerity policies. As a third factor, a combination of three defining issues is presented as a third factor: a divided left, the fact that it was the previous Socialist Party government that asked for Troika’s help, and the judicial proceedings involving ex-Prime Minister and former socialist leader José Sócrates. The three issues damaged the image of the PS. A fourth factor was the timid upturn in some economic and employment indicators over the last two years of government.

The right-wing alliance’s victory proved to be a fragile one, undermined by prevailing discontent due to growing impoverishment, high unemployment, cuts and threats to the welfare state, and so forth. With no surprise, it was put at stake by the (more surprising) willingness of the left to converge. The BE doubled its votes (from 5.2 per cent to 10.2 per cent) and increased the number of seats in Parliament from eight to 19, in part as a result of the adoption of more moderate positions. On the other hand, the PCP maintained its share of the votes, but was overtaken by the BE, which also meant a symbolic defeat. Given this general background, the results of the elections were perceived by PS’s secretary-general as an opportunity to put forward an alternative government. The fact is that the coalition government would not last long with all the parliamentary left against it. Political parties shown willingness to (or were forced to) dialogue. The rejection of a (more probable) centre-left government solution opened the way for what could be called a “political breakthrough”.

Even though large sectors of the population welcomed the new political solution, some felt threatened and grew agitated by the possibility that a government of the left would become viable with support from Blockists and Communists, including the President of the Republic at the time. The fact that both the PCP and the BE were known for their Euroscepticism and/or radicalism played an important role in the construction of a sort of fear regarding a possible “left solution”. Conversely, any kind of commitment from those two parties seemed to be, at the very least, surprising given their well-known positions. Despite all this, on 10 November 2015, a motion to reject the new coalition government was won by the parties of the left with 123 votes in favour and 107 against. A new government, led by PS, emerged from a Parliamentary agreement signed between PS, BE, PCP and the Greens. From the beginning, harmony between them was regarded by many as not long-lasting. Doubts about the guarantees to ensure the government’s stability throughout the legislative period were abundant. The new government, in functions at that time, is one of PS’s initiatives. The PCP and BE were left out, on their own wishes, owing to programmatic differences between them and the PS, especially regarding the European Union in general and the Budgetary Treaty and the renegotiation of the debt in particular (amongst others things). There are some “red lines”, the crossing of which can endanger the prevalence of this peculiar (in the sense of “brand new” and “unexpected”) political
solution. Given that, the Portuguese political scene is chronically strained in some sense, as disagreement between parts involved is always a possibility.

Under a PS-led government committed to a number of reforms pushed by a more “radical” attitude from the PCP and the BE, a different spirit and a more ambitious course towards a more social, more cohesive Europe, can be sensed. Nevertheless, agreements reached remain somewhat fragile. One year of left-wing government has gone by and agreements signed have held so far. Some attempts have been made to reverse a considerable number of austerity effects, most of them are related to aspirations of the two other partners of the government solution (PCP and BE). We can mention aspects like these: (i) reversal of the privatisation of strategic corporations (like the Portuguese airways – TAP); (ii) restitution of wages, pensions, holiday and Christmas subsidies; (iii) minimum wage raise; (iv) reset of some national holidays; (v) enforcement of labour regulations’ supervision; (vi) reinstatement of the 35 hours worked per week; (vii) creation of an unemployment benefit for independent workers (the so-called “green receipts”) and the ending of other measures that have contributed to social dumping and the impoverishment of the Portuguese middle class. An important accomplishment has been the approval of regulations concerning the existence of precarious workers in the public sector (public administration and public enterprises). The new regulation foresees the integration of the state’s “green receipts” (independent workers) as public servants, with all the rights it entails, and was pressed forward by the BE and PCP.

This left alternative has a number of impacts that are still to be fully assessed. However, the unfolding of the present legislature allows for making some considerations about its potentialities and/or limitations. From the very beginning, BE’s and PCP’s involvement in the government solution posed some questions, namely related with CGTP’s behaviour. Since the confederation’s allies are part of the political solution, will it change to a more “negotiation” style or will it honour a long contestation tradition? In a more general sense, are trade unions to be left out when explaining the success or failure of the political alternative? It can be said they have been important in the maintenance of social cohesion and thus in the government solution for continuity. In spite of its demands and combativeness, the CGTP has so far avoided more extreme or “last resort” measures, like general strikes – its main strategy in the previous period – allowing the government’s programme to unfold (Estanque and Costa 2016).

The left solution is inherently ambiguous and unveils politics’ tactical dimension. Accepting a left agreement required careful thought from the political parties involved. For the Socialist Party (PS), it meant making concessions to left-wing coalition partners, normally more radical, something that would most probably displease more conservative members and supporters and raise the opposition of both PSD and CDS. Even if such discontent will not affect PS’s position in practical terms, it weakens its position overall. On the other hand, coalition partners (BE and PCP) stand in a kind of “ungrateful” position in the sense that it implies being in government and in opposition simultaneously. This in/out position is utterly ambiguous as it means cooperating/supporting and
forming the opposition all at the same time. A “softer” opposition might displease their traditional social bases and mean a loss of support from those who protested against austerity. Conversely, both the BE and PCP are obliged to compromise, as any kind of refusal endangers the political alternative, leaving the country in a difficult position (as in Spain), and thus will be disadvantageous for them, at least in electoral terms. In sum, the political agreement between PS, BE, PCP and the Greens can both foster or be prejudicial for these political parties’ current positions and their image in the political field. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that the PCP faces strong competition from the BE and vice-versa (and the latter surpassed the former in electoral results recently). They compete for the same social support bases and try to advance their own perspectives in what concerns a viable Left alternative. Such a competitive attitude might be problematic in the near future.

Finally, when analysing the “success” or “survival” of the Left solution so far, one should not neglect the personal style of the actual Portuguese Prime-Minister. António Costa has displayed great adroitness in managing conflicting interests and positions. Contrasting with his predecessors both in office and in the PS’s structure, Mr Costa inspires confidence. He is what can be called an “aggregating personality”, that is, he stirs sympathy and has an appealing influence, generating a collective consensus. During times of personalisation of politics, this has certainly been an asset for the Left solution so far.

**Conclusion**

The protest cycle from 2011 to 2013 acted as a catalyst for political change and was a paradigmatic milieu for relations between political parties and network social movements, at least in Portugal. Despite being frequently seen by the traditional actors (like trade unions) as having an inorganic and discontinuous character, social movements and their organisations are not isolated islands. Conversely, they emerge from and act within complex political landscapes. In that sense, political parties were part and parcel of the protest cycle, playing an important role even, if unintentionally sometimes. Left-wing political parties were social movements’ important allies on many occasions. In embracing the claims of social movements, particularly those concerning labour relations and the defence of workers’ basic rights, they rehabilitated their public image, which was very damaged in the last couple of years, especially in the period of Troika’s bailout programme.

This unfolding relationship was, nevertheless, peculiar in the sense that attitudes from both parties responded to changes in the external and internal contexts of the organisations. Anti-austerity mobilisations have evolved from a straightforward rejection of political parties and “old” institutional actors – an anti-political stance and institutional distrust connected with radical perspectives of total rupture with the system – to a tacit acceptance of the new parliamentary solution. More precisely, left-wing political parties (BE and PCP) became possible allies in spite of their persistent differences (and tacit concurrence between
them). A clearer and more realistic formulation of claims from social movements accompanied a phasing out of the harsh critique directed at political parties. Support granted by left-wing parties to the anti-austerity movement varied according to their “pretentions” to achieve power. Due to that support and their accomplishments, trade unions and political parties — especially PCP — changed their perceptions up to a point and started perceiving them as possible allies that could help bring down the government. Objectively, the protest cycle was used to put pressure not only on the former majority but also on those who did not offer any alternatives, allowing the continuation of “more of the same”.

Being a chronic candidate to office, the Socialist Party was not as supportive as the Left Bloc (BE), instead displaying careful and ambivalent attitudes. As for the Communist Party (PCP), it also tried to keep a relative distance from the social movement, at least for a while. As an “old” Left representative, that political party “competes” with the “new” Left (the Left Bloc), which has called itself “The party of social movements”. Though simple, such an explanation might clarify some positions assumed throughout the protest cycle.

As a matter of fact, austerity effects on the Portuguese population facilitated a new opportunity structure where new political actors could emerge — the “Desperate Generation” and “Screw the Troika” — and “old” actors intensified their action (the CGTP, for instance). On the other hand and different to Spain, where, as stated by Díaz-Parra et al. in Chapter 3 of this book, anti-austerity protests and social movements led to the emergence of a new political party (Podemos), in Portugal there was no consequence concerning the formation of a consolidated political actor. Portuguese mass protests were probably more intense in specific actions (12 March 2011, 15 September 2012 and 2 March 2013) but they disseminated and disappeared afterwards. So, the Portuguese movement dynamic did not foster organised networks and nuclei as in Spain. Here, the mentioned new political party sprung up from the closeness of conventional political institutions while their original force came from the bottom-up street protests and their network articulations. At the same time, the lack of efficiency of street protests in what concerns substantive impacts and “solutions” pushed some leaders to take action and Podemos came out. However, once again, contrary to what happened in its neighbour, the Portuguese movement dynamics paved the way for a new political solution in which “more radical” left-wing parties and class struggles played an important role.

Since the beginning (November 2015), the new parliament majority and the government led by A. Costa’s leadership was under attack. First, the former Prime Minister, Passos Coelho, was particularly violent against this solution starting with criticisms like “the defeated party is going to rule” or “the new leader does everything to achieve power”. After a while, the atmosphere evolved towards some other formulations like the one that remains to this day: “The Con-traption”18 Government. This notion, suggested by a right-wing opinion-maker, was initially directed to the Socialist Party, but public opinion picked it up and spread it out. Other observers, more sympathetic, have also named this political solution as “The flying cow”, a metaphor to emphasise the “miracle” of watching
a cow fly, similar to such surprising agreement among these different – and normally divergent – political parties. No matter how difficult it was, the political alternative in Portugal brought some important accomplishments regarding precarious work, social rights and working-class conquests, albeit not being considered a consistent solution. Until now (January 2017), it has worked and “the cow still flies”.

Notes
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2 “Contraption” (“Geringonça”) refers to a strange looking device or apparatus, which seems to work or move in a very precarious and fragile manner.
4 On the one hand, CGTP was clearly against the terms and targets of the MoU, pointing to the need for an immediate renegotiation of debt, interest and deadlines, in order to avoid further recession and increase the risk of unemployment and poverty. The UGT, on the other hand, was more cautious about the requirements of the MoU, stressing the need to respect the commitments made with the European Union and the IMF, in order to create conditions for renegotiation and the extension of time and interest (UGT 2011; CGTP 2014; Costa 2015).
5 www.europesocialsurvey.org.
6 See also Chapter 3 of this book.
7 The discussion about the meaning of “social movements” is the subject of different classification proposals. Salvador Aguilar (2001) proposed five types of social movements: (1) primitive (pre-industrial era): religious, forms of social banditry; (2) classic (eighteenth century to the first third of the nineteenth century): labour movement, nationalism movements, socialist movements; (3) new social movements (1960s to 1980s): ecologist movement, pacifist, feminist, sexual liberation; (4) brand new social movements (1990s): solidarity movements, NGOs, for a global civil society, movements of users of public services; (5) peripheral and anti-systemic movements (last third of the twentieth century and located in the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system), resistance movements to autocracies, Zapatista movement or landless movement/MST. More recently, Campos Lima and Martín Arílles (2013) have used the terminology “brand new social movements” (“novíssimos movimentos sociais”) mainly to refer to movements with a capacity for attracting groups that the unions find difficult to organise; the unemployed, those in precarious work and young people in general.
8 See Zald and Ash (1966).
9 In the countries encompassed by the “Arab Spring” (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), governments and regimes fell apart because of the magnitude and intensity of the street demonstrations.
The framework of analysis proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995) relies on the distinction between the "old" and "new" Left. Such distinction may be criticisable given its blurred character.

Between January 2006 and July 2013, Ortiz et al. (2013) analysed global protests in 87 countries (covering more than 90 per cent of the world's population). The protests were promoted by four different groups: (1) people's rights (302 protests), which included protests of several types: ethnic, indigenous and racial, labour, freedom of association, religious issues, LGBT, immigrants, prisoners, etc.; (2) global justice (311 protests), especially against the IMF and other financial institutions, against imperialism, free trade and the G20, and on behalf of environmental justice and "global commons"; (3) the failure of political representation and political systems (376 protests), generally centred on denouncing the lack of real democracy, business influence, deregulation and privatisation, corruption, absence of justice emanating from the legal system, surveillance, the army and the military industrial complex, etc. (4) for economic justice and against austerity (488 protests), especially focused on public services, tax justice, wage and working conditions, inequality, poverty and living standards, pension systems, fuel prices, food prices, etc. (Ortiz et al. 2013, 14).

When an "old" Left is non-pacified, divisions are usually between social-democrats and communists. The importance, the organisational and ideological makeup, as well as the strategies of the "two parts" of the Left, depend to a large extent on the institutional structures and prevailing strategies of a given country (Kriesi et al. 1995). The heritage of the prevailing strategies to deal with the challenges has a lasting impact on the strategies and the structure of the old Left. The heritage of exclusive strategies contributes to the radicalisation and split between Left currents. The split between Left currents may foster the further radicalisation of the labour movement. Such a tradition of extra-parliamentary action is likely to continue to affect the labour movement's strategies with regard to new social movements. Given that, parties of the old Left and the labour movement are seen as more likely to support the actions of new social movements in exclusive regimes. This tendency will be reinforced by the fact that exclusive strategies affect not only the relations between new social movements and party members but also those among police members themselves (which are more polarised in exclusive regimes, and, therefore, more likely to confront each other by way of extra-parliamentary mobilisation).

In general, a decrease of mobilisation levels is expected when the Left is in government for two reasons: on one side, reforms that can benefit social movements are foreseen and, on the other, social movements lose their most powerful ally (Kriesi et al. 1995).

The protest was launched via Facebook by four young people from Lisbon and announced as non-partisan, secular and pacifist. The adjectives used to define the protest had two effects. On the one hand, that definition was a source of attractiveness that allowed the expression of uneven interests – for instance, the non-partisan epithet allowed far-right participation, displeasing many people. On the other, it gave the protest a broader sense with the negative effect of making it more difficult to define a concrete direction as well as objectives. The name "Geração à Rasca" is, as pointed out by Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015), a clear reference to a previous cycle of protest in the early 1990s, and especially to university and high-school student protests against the then PSD government's educational reforms. At the time, both media and political elites accused the mobilisation of students as serving only their particular interests: it was thus named Geração Rasca – the "Trashy Generation" (Seixas 2005 cited in Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015). The 2011 protests recovered this title and gave it a new meaning.

The "Inflexible Precarious" (PJ) was created in 2007, in Lisbon (Portugal's capital city), with the goal of giving continuity to the mobilisation accomplished with May Day (an action day against labour precariousness). The main objective was to fill the
void in relation to the struggle against labour precariousness. With May Day being a process limited in time, the constitution of an autonomous group, or social movement organisation, aimed at assuring the maintenance of social action targeting that problem seemed a logical step for those who had been involved. They took after FERVE (direct translation to English: fed up with these green receipts, but the acronym also means “spoil”) a group that existed in Oporto, adopting however a more comprehensive focus that included all forms of labour precariousness. As a social movement organisation, the PI was informal, horizontal, with no hierarchies or formal leadership, and resistant to whatever form of bureaucracy.

16 See Kriesi et al. (1995).
17 José Socrates faced charges of corruption, tax fraud and illicit enrichment, in a judicial process still ongoing.
18 In Portuguese, the term is “Gerengança” (see note 2 above). The “flying cow” was also a result of the image of a toy (a flying cow), shown on TV, showing the Prime Minister offering it as a gift to his minister (in derisory fashion).

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