Routledge Handbook of Africa–Asia Relations

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ASIA IN LUSOPHONE AFRICA

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Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a broader perspective on several aspects of the main Asian powers in Lusophone Africa, adding some value to the on-going discussion of Asia and Africa. Despite growing interest in African and Asian studies, this is an under-researched topic, due mainly to the absence of scholars interested in Asian studies who are also fluent in Portuguese and interested in focusing on Lusophone Africa. Research is also limited by a lack of incentives in Portuguese-speaking countries to study Asia. The main body of literature focuses on China’s relations with the African continent in general, not Lusophone Africa specifically.

The first generation of China–Africa literature, which broadly speaking emerged during the first decade of the twenty-first century, resulted in several think tank reports and a few academic articles and books – from authors such as Alden (2009), Ian Taylor (2009), Deborah Brautigam (2009), and Shinn & Eisenman (2012). The novelty of the growing dimension of Asian presence in the region brought a great deal of attention to this relationship and many narratives emerged on different modus operandi. China in particular received a great deal of attention for pursuing resources, bringing its own workers to key projects, building alliances with authoritarian governments such as that in Angola, turning a blind eye to corruption and, perhaps, even encouraging corruption. Although many of those assumptions were proved inaccurate over time, they did hold elements of truth, including the existence of turnkey projects, problems with environmental and labour relations, huge groups of Chinese labourers that exclusively worked on projects, and the Chinese engaging in self-serving activities. However, a more sophisticated understanding tells us that there is much more to the story than those initial images.

These narratives have been combined with a view of Asia as a head-to-head rival in the continent, spreading throughout Africa trying to secure, in a kind of mercantilist fashion, exclusive rights and control over territory, government relations, and energy markets while entering the world stage as a competitor for oil, gas, and mineral resources. Western literature also conjures images of Asia as a competitor that does not consider local needs, anxious to export manufactured goods and import natural resources in the short-term; or as a neo-colonizer with a long-term strategy to replace the West, presenting itself as a partner for development, willing to share its experience and successful economic model (Brautigam & Tang, 2011:28; Lagerkvist & Jonsson, 2011:9; Ilhéu, 2011:49). The nature of this trade balance is considered damaging for
the region in the long term because Asians buy raw materials instead of manufactured goods, delaying the development of local industries and leading to unemployment. Thus emerges a common argument in the literature: tensions in political relationships and in interactions with locals increase when industrialization processes evolve (see, for example, the arguments presented in the East Asia Special Issue, Mendes, 2013b).

Lusophone Africa refers to the five African countries where Portuguese is an official language: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe. The Asian powers with the most visible presence in Lusophone Africa are Japan, India, South Korea, and especially the People's Republic of China, except in Sao Tome and Principe, which maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This chapter analyses Asian countries’ policy goals and the kinds of relations they have established with each Lusophone country. The first section provides an overview of Asia’s cooperation mechanisms in Africa, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. The second section looks at the presence of and the different approaches adopted by China, Japan, India, and South Korea towards each of the Portuguese-speaking African countries. The question raised is are they genuinely building a new relationship of collaboration, or one of competition, helping Lusophone Africa or helping themselves? In other words, it analyses if development cooperation – aid, trade, and foreign direct investment – is an instrument to secure access to natural resources and if economic links are used for political leverage.

Asian powers allocate different types of aid to Lusophone Africa, as the nature of their bilateral relations varies. Two of them, Japan and Korea, are OECD/DAC donors, i.e., they follow the Western development concept, which is more altruistic and directed towards ‘soft aid’ or social sectors. China’s model differs from the West’s in that it not only imposes conditions on providing aid, it also provides policy advice (Egggen & Roland, 2014:94–95). It adopts a very pragmatic approach, leaving each country to find its own path out of poverty, although its aid model is also changing towards increased poverty reduction. India’s aid is somewhere in between the two models. This chapter sheds some light on the discussion over which Asian donors provide Africans with the right instruments and conditions.

Asia–Africa cooperation mechanisms

Despite sharing some goals and principles, Asian powers do not take a homogeneous approach towards the Portuguese-speaking countries; they prioritize different interests and follow specific models of cooperation to achieve them. However, they share similar interests in importing natural resources and exporting manufactured products, and concentrate aid on infrastructure projects, health, and human development sectors. The Chinese are better known for the resources-for-infrastructure deals and the no-strings-attached approach. The only political condition that Beijing imposes on its formal external relations is respect for the ‘One China’ policy, which holds that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Non-interference in domestic affairs, one of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, is also acknowledged by Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter of 2015. Japan considers human security as one of its basic policies (Atanassova-Cornelis & Mendes, 2010:409), along with economic development and consolidation of peace (Raposo, 2011:336). The Indian cooperation model is very much focused on human development and is more service-oriented, inspiring other countries to bypass industrialization and go straight from agriculture to the modern service sector (Mendes, 2013a:75).

Japan and South Korea strike a balance between Asian and Western values, following OECD-DAC norms but positioning themselves as stakeholders able to make connections with G-77 countries. This underpinned South Korea’s offer to host Busan and Japan’s sympathy with
the south–south cooperation ideal of transferring Asian experience to Africa (Raposo & Potter, 2010:190). In political terms, Seoul carefully monitors North Korea’s gradual strengthening of its African links, namely in Angola (Daarqaq & Neville 2014:8). The Japanese presence in Africa can either be understood as an independent strategy concentrated on national interests (Lagerkvist & Jonsson 2011:11), such as attracting votes for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council (Raposo & Potter, 2010:183); or as a reaction to China’s use of aid to attain great power status, which in turn seems to encourage Tokyo to raise its own diplomatic profile (Atanassova-Cornelis & Mendes 2010:405). In any case, Japan’s substantial presence in the continent, not only regarding aid but also trade and investment, does not have the media coverage or the visibility of China’s, whose competition thus fosters Japan’s ‘hidden agenda’ in Africa (Lehman, 2013).

Asian development cooperation institutions are all structured differently, and decision-making is more centralized at the capital level in China and India (Castillejo & Hackenesch, 2014:4) than it is in Japan, where aid decision-making within the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is an administrative decision, not a political one (Raposo & Potter, 2010:181). The government of South Korea provides financial aid to developing nations worldwide through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA, 2008). After decades of sustained economic development and becoming a member of the DAC in 2010, South Korea holds the title of first official aid-recipient-turned-donor (Roehrig, 2013).

Despite favouring bilateral relations, Asian countries have shown some multilateral activism in Africa: the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was created in 2000; the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was organized in 1993; the first edition of the India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) took place in New Delhi in 2008; and the Korea–Africa Forum, first held in 2006, had its fourth edition in 2015. These regional initiatives state very similar goals, which include serving as multilateral platforms for cooperation with African countries in different dimensions and providing alternatives to the Washington Consensus’ cooperation framework in Africa. It does seem, however, that FOCAC stands out. Over the past 15 years, it has consolidated a comprehensive structure and operating mechanisms, which include multi-level interactions, reaching a considerable level of institutionalization, both in China and in Africa, beyond regular high-level meetings (Li Anshan et al., 2012:15–22).

The TICAD, initially conceived as a consultative forum for extensive discussions on development with African leaders, was used to increase Japan’s international influence in Africa, especially after the failure of Japan’s attempt to be elected a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2005. Its primary focus has shifted from development assistance to the promotion of private sector trade and investment. The 2013 TICAD 5 included the participation of heads of state and governments of 51 African countries, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, representatives from Asian nations, international organizations, and private sector organizations. TICAD differs from the forums promoted by China and India in endorsing neither non-interference nor the reform of existing international institutions; it rather relies on them, as TICAD 5 was jointly organized by the Government of Japan, the African Union Commission, the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank (UN, 2008:6; Japan, 2014; Japan, 2013a, 2013b:22–23).

The IAFS reflects the evolution of India–Africa relations, with the third summit being announced as India’s largest-ever outreach event towards Africa, reflecting a clear intent to increase participation after the limited numbers present at the first two editions – 14 countries in 2008 and 15 countries in 2011. The first official declaration of the IAFS focused on the issue
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of climate change and emphasized principles of non-interference, echoing the rhetoric of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) official documents, while also arguing for reform of the ‘international financial architecture, especially the international financial institutions, to reflect the changing global situation’ (Africa & India, 2008:3), as well as improving south–south cooperation. In the second summit, the need to reform the United Nations and the political weight India and Africa ought to secure in it are specifically mentioned (Africa & India, 2011a), reflecting the Ezulwini Consensus’ and reviews of the 2010 Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.9

Just like its Asian counterparts, South Korea has come to promote a cooperation mechanism to help boost its influence and increase cooperation with the African continent: the Korea–Africa Forum, which has moved from a dialogue on trade and investment to encompassing socio-economic issues. Between the first and second editions, the number of African countries represented more than doubled, increasing from 15 to 35 (Kim, 2012). The 2009 Seoul Declaration recognizes the complementary structures of both economies and a commitment to promote ‘enlarged cooperation in such fields as railways, ports, roads, electricity, communication systems and natural resources’. Furthermore, the Framework for Korea–Africa Development Cooperation 2009–2012 and the Korea–Africa Green Growth Initiative 2009–2012 act as important roadmaps for bilateral policies (South Korea, 2009:5, 7).

Asian interests in Lusophone Africa

Lusophone Africa achieved independence from Portugal after the 1974 Carnation Revolution and created, with its former colonizer and Brazil, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996, in which Japan gained observer status in 2014 (CPLP, 2015). However, despite sharing a common identity and traditions, Lusophone Africa is not monolithic. In sub-Saharan Africa, Angola is a large country, very rich in oil and other natural resources and capable of defending its own interests; it has caught China’s attention, particularly over the past decade. Mozambique, with the discovery of off-shore gas deposits and prospects for extensive coal mining, is also starting to attract growing investment. None of the other Portuguese-speaking African countries holds a similar bargaining position. The archipelago of Cape Verde is a small country made up of different types of islands with an important geopolitical location, in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, at the crossroads of three continents. It does not have resources besides sun, scenery, and sandy beaches; however, it has a parliamentary democracy, low corruption levels, and good human development, which translates into economic and political stability and a staff well suited to participate in advanced training. Sao Tome and Principe is apparently trying to evolve in this direction. It is one of the smallest countries in Africa, with two volcanic islands and located in the oil-rich waters of the Gulf of Guinea. Petroleum discoveries in the Joint Development Zone with Nigeria, along with the potential for improving the tourist industry, may contribute to reducing this heavily-indebted, poor nation’s dependency on cocoa. The West African country of Guinea-Bissau, considered a narco-state (a country whose economy is dependent on the trade in illegal drugs), suffers from great instability and its resources are limited to wood and fishery; its offshore waters are among the world’s richest in fish stocks.

China currently enjoys the most visible presence in Lusophone Africa. At the multilateral level, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, which targets the whole continent, does not pay special attention to Lusophone Africa as suggested by the sixth Ministerial Conference held in Johannesburg in 2015. However, Beijing hosts the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries, also known as the ‘Macau Forum’, as its permanent secretariat is headquartered in this Chinese Special Administrative Region. The Forum
includes all Lusophone countries except Sao Tome and Principe, which has the status of observer because it established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1997 (Mendes, 2014:231–232).

Taiwan is one of Sao Tome and Principe’s main partners along with the EU, the UNDP, and Portugal. Taiwanese development aid focuses on agriculture, food security, and public health – including medical assistance and malaria eradication, education and human resources, infrastructures and rural development, energy and information, and communications technology (Lopes, 2013:99–100; Macauhub, 2014a; STP & EU, 2014:12, 22). In exchange, Sao Tome helps Taipei promote its bid to participate in international organizations (The China Post, 2013). Despite these ties to Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party maintains connections in the country, due to its support during the colonial war, to the political party that proclaimed independence – which is now the main opposition party. Moreover, the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) Sinopec has an indirect presence in Block 2 of the Nigeria–Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Zone (CGD, 2014:29–30). In November 2013, a few days before the fourth ministerial conference of the Macau Forum, the Foreign Minister of Sao Tome visited Beijing, and China decided to reengage economically with the island state. A Chinese trade representative office was set up in Sao Tome and Principe, which became the first of Taiwan’s four diplomatic allies in Africa to have a Chinese trade mission (Shih, 2013:1, 2014:3). Besides building roads, commercial facilities, sewage disposal plants, and upgrading the main airport, Beijing announced the construction of a deep-water port to facilitate oil exportation and sea-borne commerce (Rotberg, 2013).

Guinea-Bissau also maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, from 1990 to 1998. Before declaring the end of the relationship in 1990, China constantly renewed its agreement on economic and technological cooperation with Guinea and built several infrastructures. From 1998 onwards, besides the rehabilitation of public housing, schools, and health facilities, Beijing announced funding for the construction of a massive dam, a deep-water port, a bridge, and the rehabilitation of two main highways. In terms of symbolic buildings, China constructed the justice palace and the national parliament building, and rehabilitated the presidential palace. Besides infrastructure, they have focused on power-generating equipment, agro-technology, and fishery cooperation (PRC, 2006); the 2006 deep-water fisheries agreement opened the door for Chinese fishing vessels to operate in Guinea’s Exclusive Economic Zone. China provides local assistance in those areas, training for public servants and military officers, and scholarships to Chinese universities. Budget and humanitarian assistance is also provided, along with shipments of rice and the exemption of selected local products from Chinese tariffs (Horta, 2010, 2012:35; Macauhub, 2014b; Nguema & Doland, 2007; ANGOP, 2013).

The Chinese government also constructed public buildings in Cape Verde, such as the National Assembly and the government palaces, as well as a dam; it also provides health, education, military, and information and communications technology cooperation. For China, Cape Verde is a bridge to Africa and an attractive market for its manufactured products. Small-scale Chinese traders established shops throughout the archipelago, especially from the mid 1990s onwards, contributing to the development of a market economy and creating a few jobs, despite also being blamed for promoting competition (Macauhub, 2013a; Horta, 2008).

China’s relations with the other two Portuguese-speaking African countries are very different, being mainly focused on energy security concerns and natural resources. In Mozambique, considering the value of the loans, infrastructure projects, and assistance provided through FOCAC, China is by far its most important Asian partner, although India, Japan, and South Korea have also increased their engagement in recent years (Castillejo & Hackenesch, 2014:5). Besides gas and coal, the Chinese are interested in fishery, agriculture, and timber, while building public infrastructures and exporting manufactured products. With Luanda, Beijing developed
its strongest and most opaque relationship in Africa, framed by the credit line negotiated with a post-war Angola in desperate need of reconstruction. Chinese SOE investments favour infrastructure, transport, and the oil and diamond sectors, while funds from the credit line have been channelled to technical and social cooperation, including the construction of schools and medical facilities, utility services such as water and sanitation, and training programmes for human resource development (Kiala & Ngwenya, 2011:16–17).

China’s multi-tier strategy has reached a level of sophistication that enables the country to draw on its experience in creating Special Economic Zones (SEZ), formally sponsored by the Chinese government through its Ministry of Commerce (Hendler, 2014). Exporting the concept to developing countries to facilitate foreign direct investment and technology transfer, Beijing vowed that Africa would receive Chinese overseas SEZ (FOCAC, 2009). Among Lusophone countries, Angola’s SEZ in Luanda-Bengo, established in 2009, has proved to be a successful enterprise and is regarded as a reference (Angola, 2015). Mozambique established a SEZ in 2012 in Manga-Mungassa, under the management of China’s Dingsheng International Investment Company (Sojoea Group), and in 2014 announced the creation of a new SEZ, in Mocuba (Macauhub, 2015a). Cape Verde has also shown great interest in creating an SEZ in Sao Vicente, which would be initially linked to fishing activities (Panapress, 2007).

Japan’s presence in Africa tends to be discussed in terms of aid, but there is also considerable amounts of private companies, investment, and trade involved (Japan, 2013b:20–21). As in the case of China, Japanese private investment in Africa, despite growing interest in manufacturing and services, targets resources and infrastructure. In Angola and Mozambique, Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi, Nippon Steel, and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. obtain contracts to process resources and to build or rehabilitate roads, railways, and ports to create logistics corridors for resources, linking Africa’s interior to Indian Ocean trade routes and Japan.

With Angola, one of Japan’s major oil suppliers, technical assistance focuses on mineral resources, rice cultivation, and development of human resources, and a Japanese–Angolan bilateral investment agreement is currently being negotiated (Japan, 2011, 2013c). In Mozambique, besides natural gas, coal, and rare earths, Tokyo is interested in creating a more reliable energy source in Maputo, in part due to Mitsubishi’s presence in aluminium smelting, and has announced funding for the construction of an electrical substation (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2014; Macauhub, 2015b). Prompted by the lack of food in Mozambique, agriculture is another sector of growing cooperation; in conjunction with Brazil, Japan is developing an agricultural development zone, the so-called ProSAVANA — it is highly controversial, however, as small farmers fear land-grabbing (Chichava, et al., 2013:5, 12–14, 22; see also Classen, 2013; Classen et al., 2014). Along with Mozambique, Cape Verde has received a much greater share of Japanese aid in the past years, including construction of desalination plants (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2014; JICA, 2013). In Sao Tome and Principe, Japan decided to extend food aid, namely by donating rice, and develop fishery cooperation. It is one of Sao Tome’s main partners in fisheries, along with the European Union, and announced it was going to fund the construction of a fishing port in 2015 (Japan, 2010; STP & EU, 2014:12, 22; Macauhub, 2014c).

Sao Tome and Principe also receives support from India in the agricultural, educational, and health sectors (STP & EU, 2014:14). In exchange, it offered support for India’s non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2011–2012 term and for eventually becoming a permanent member. However, high-level contacts have been limited to side-line talks at multilateral meetings and bilateral trade is almost negligible, mainly due to shipping time and high costs. The lines of credit offered by India in 2009 remained unused as the government of Sao Tome and Principe did not prepare the groundwork for specific infrastructure projects (India, 2014a). In Guinea-Bissau, India grants scholarships, training, and assistance programmes, although

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bilateral cooperation is far more recent than trade ties in the cashew nut sector, making India the first destination of the country’s exports (India, 2013a; AfDB et al., 2011:3).

With Maputo, the Indian government maintains regular high-level exchanges and scholarship offers for Mozambican nationals, as well as training for government officials. The first of the five Indian credit lines granted in 2003, which cover several projects from sanitation to transmission lines, became operational one year later through an agreement between India’s EXIM Bank and the Mozambican government (India, 2014b). Mozambique is the third largest recipient of Indian credit lines in Africa (Castillejo & Hackenesch, 2014:5) and India is one of its biggest investors, attracted by the large reserves of natural gas — much needed to feed its power stations — exploring coal through the International Coal Ventures Ltd consortium (India, 2013b:4–5; Macauhub, 2014d). This is framed by the 2009 Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement and the 2014 memorandum of understanding on oil and gas cooperation (India & Mozambique, 2009; Lusa, 2014). Bilateral trade also increased in recent years: Mozambique mainly exports coal coke to India, along with raw cashew, coconut, metal ores, and scrap metal; it imports Indian pharmaceuticals, rice, wheat, machinery, and manufactured products (India, 2014c). The Indian Ocean is perceived as ‘a route for travel and cooperation’ and not a ‘barrier’ (UN, 2008:6), with exchanges starting during the pre-colonial period. The Lusophone connection is highlighted by the fact that many Indians holding Mozambican nationality originally came from Goa, Daman, and Diu, all former Portuguese colonies (India, 2013b:1, 6).

In Angola, India is surpassed by China, being the second largest trading partner, granting lines of credit for railway rehabilitation and agricultural equipment, including tractors. Indian exports also include leather, paper and wood products, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, and food and drinks. Fast-growing bilateral trade reveals the importance of Angola as a source of crude oil for India, which is also interested in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and in the diamond sector. India frames participation in infrastructure programmes within a south–south cooperation logic aiding Angolan national reconstruction (India, 2013c).

South Korea has been another important partner for Angola, following the same pattern of other Asian powers by providing loans in exchange for natural resources (Darracq & Neville 2014:5). Bilateral cooperation focuses on industry, public transportation, education (ANGOP, 2012), reconstruction and construction of infrastructures, and Seoul is also interested in LNG. In the oil sector, Angola’s state-owned oil producer (Sonangol) cooperates with Daewoo, and deals with Angola’s national electricity producer (Empresa Nacional de Electricidade – ENE) reveal South Korean business interests in hydroelectric, solar, and alternative energy.

In Mozambique, Seoul also has interests in the energy sector, offering courses on the natural gas industry, including risk management, and regional development policy (Macauhub, 2014e). The Trade-Investment Promotion Agency opened a Korea Business Centre in Maputo, soon after the establishment of the Korean Embassy in 2013 (Macauhub, 2013b), and South Korean companies increased their investments in infrastructure and mining. Seoul has only recently begun providing aid to Mozambique (Castillejo & Hackenesch, 2014:5), supporting socio-economic development efforts through priority areas of the Action Plan for Poverty Reduction: education, health, public infrastructures, roads and bridges, and environment (Jackson, 2012; Panapress, 2014).

**Conclusion: Asia as an alternative donor?**

This chapter focused on the bilateral relationships between major Asian countries and each of the Portuguese-speaking African countries individually, instead of focusing on the region in general.
The first section explained the cooperation mechanisms supporting Asian policies towards Lusophone Africa while the second section discussed the typology of Asian goals and actions and the different types of cooperation established in Lusophone Africa, including political cooperation, trade, and development aid. The chapter raised the question of whether development cooperation is used to obtain natural resources and facilitate trade and foreign direct investment. It highlighted that Asian governments are driven by foreign policy strategies, defined in terms of national interest, including looking for new markets and securing natural resources to feed their own economies. Therefore, analysis of the priority goals of Asian countries, including access to raw materials to guarantee economic growth, suggests that their presence is more visible in countries that are richer in natural resources, following a pattern of resource diplomacy.

These goals are arguably implemented in Lusophone Africa through south–south cooperation rhetoric, disguising a paternalistic relationship with a win-win partnership discourse, employed to obscure goals of political power and wealth. Asians position themselves as development partners, rather than donors in the Western sense. Relations are framed by a south–south cooperation approach of two types. On the one hand, Japan and Korea share Western and DAC norms and accept dialogue within the OECD. Despite sharing Asian values with their neighbours, they are closer to norms such as democracy and human rights. On the other hand, China and India promote the principle of non-interference and stand for a business-approach to south–south cooperation, showing a lack of interest in initiatives to better coordinate development, noticeable within the G-77 and the UN.

Thus, norms that are obligatory for Japan and Korea are arbitrary for China (although to a lesser extent) and India, who do not show interest in defining international rules that may limit their external action. As a result, African Lusophone countries, which have transitioned to multiparty systems but are suspicious of discussing issues regarding human rights and good governance in the near future, compromise with the ‘conditions’ of Japan and South Korea, compared with China’s and India’s ‘emptiness’, or absence of them. This chapter highlighted the similarities and differences between the models followed by these four Asian donors and their impact on Asia–Lusophone Africa relations. One of the major findings is that Lusophone Africa is increasingly becoming an economic and diplomatic battleground between Asian countries, and it is not clear if this competition will evolve to collaboration and coordination in the field. China is now the lead trading partner, considering both its bilateral relationships and its role as a central strategic player on the continent.

The perception of Asia as an alternative donor to traditional aid donors within the north–south dichotomy was also analysed, considering the criticism that is often levelled regarding involvement in Portuguese-speaking Africa. The south–south cooperation strategies have contributed towards strengthening Asia’s relations with Lusophone countries, arguably challenging Western interests. However, the West cannot stop Asian donors from becoming more powerful in global relations. They are important politically, diplomatically, in peacekeeping, and, first and foremost, economically, including in investment and trading, with an increasing presence of Asian traders as actors in local markets. There is currently a natural readjustment occurring in the hierarchy of power that reflects Asia’s position as an important actor.

A wide range of factors determines power in international relations, including economic power and political power. Some of those factors are resources and size: countries with more financial and economic resources are naturally more important players in the global economy and in global politics. In the case of Asian countries, there was a discrepancy between their economic size and role in the international system: a focus on domestic development and isolation from the outside world resulted in a low-profile foreign policy lasting decades. In the past years, Asian governments have developed external relations through economic diplomacy: economic
ties with Africa, including African exports to Asian countries and Asian foreign direct investment in Africa, grew rapidly. However, the future of Asia in Lusophone Africa should be made compatible with the interests of developing countries, in terms of economic development, well-being, and good governance.

Asian donors’ south–south cooperation model is also affecting the balance of power between Lusophone nations. Lusophone Africa must overcome this divide, finding its comparative advantages and attracting Asian powers to a dialogue focused on common interests, guaranteeing long-lasting collaborations. The question is whether Africa can develop and take this partnership as an opportunity for trading more and better, beyond an aid-recipient mentality.

Notes

1 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1955, include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

2 The Washington consensus, a broader set of understandings of the Bretton Woods institutions rooted in Anglo-American views, over time has come to mean macroeconomic stabilization, broader economic liberalization, democracy and democratization, and governance reforms.


4 Regarding the Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, it was agreed to continue building on cooperation on economic and political issues, science, technology, research and development, social development and capacity building, health, culture and sports, tourism, infrastructure, energy and environment, and media and communications (Africa & India, 2011b).

5 Special Economic Zones are regions/cities with special economic policies and flexible governmental measures that provide tax incentives for foreign enterprises, to attract investments.

6 ‘Asian values have been defined as putting emphasis on a consensual approach, communitarianism rather than individualism, social order and harmony, respect for elders, discipline, a paternalistic State and the primary role of government in economic development. This would, in theory, contrast with “Western values”, associated with transparency, accountability, global competitiveness, a universalistic outlook and universal practices, and an emphasis on private initiatives and the independence of the private sector’ (Pfister, 2008:8).

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