Nuestra America
Reinventing a Subaltern Paradigm of Recognition and Redistribution

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The European American Century

According to Hegel, we recall, universal history goes from the East to the West. Asia is the beginning, while Europe is the ultimate end of universal history, the place where the civilizational trajectory of humankind is fulfilled. The biblical and medieval idea of the succession of empires (translatio imperii) becomes in Hegel the triumphal way of the Universal Idea. In each era a people takes on the responsibility of conducting the Universal Idea, thereby becoming the historical universal people, a privilege which has in turn passed from the Asian to the Greek, then to the Roman, and, finally, to the German peoples. America, or rather, North America, carries, for Hegel, an ambiguous future, in that it does not collide with the utmost fulfilling of the universal history in Europe. The future of (North) America is still a European future, made up of Europe’s left-over population.

This Hegelian idea underlies the dominant conception of the 20th century as the American century: the European American century. Herein implied is the notion that the Americanization of the world, starting with the Americanization of Europe itself, is but an effect of the European universal cunning of reason, which, having reached the Far West and unreconciled with the exile to which Hegel had condemned it, was forced to turn back, walk back upon its own track and once again trace the path of its hegemony over the East. Americanization, as a hegemonic form of globalization, is thus the third act of the millennial drama of Western supremacy. The first act, to a large extent a failed act, was the Crusades, which started the second millennium of the Christian era; the second act, beginning halfway through...
the millennium, was the discoveries and subsequent European expansion. In this millennial conception, the European American century carries little novelty; it is nothing more than one more European century, the last one of the millennium. Europe, after all, has always contained many Europes, some of them dominant, others dominated. The United States of America is the last dominant Europe; like the previous ones, it exerts its uncontested power over the dominated Europes. The feudal lords of 11th-century Europe had and desired as little autonomy vis-a-vis Pope Urban II, who recruited them for the Crusades, as the European Union countries today vis-a-vis the USA of President Clinton, who recruits them to the Balkan wars. From one episode to the other, only the dominant conception of the dominant West has been restricted. The more restrictive the conception of the West, the closer the East. Jerusalem is now Kosovo.

In these conditions it is hard to think of any alternative to the current regime of international relations which has become a core element of what I call hegemonic globalization. However, such an alternative is not only necessary but urgent, since the current regime, as it loses coherence, becomes more violent and unpredictable, thus enhancing the vulnerability of subordinate social groups, regions and nations. The real danger, both as regards intranational and international relations, is the emergence of what I call societal fascism. Fleeing from Germany a few months before his death, Walter Benjamin wrote his Theses on the Theory of History (1980) prompted by the idea that European society lived at the time in a moment of danger. I think that today we live in a moment of danger as well. In Benjamin’s time the danger was the rise of fascism as a political regime. In our time, the danger is the rise of fascism as a societal regime. Unlike political fascism, societal fascism is pluralistic, coexists easily with the democratic state, and its privileged time-space, rather than being national, is both local and global.

Societal fascism is a set of social processes by which large bodies of populations are irreversibly kept outside or thrown out of any kind of social contract (Santos, 1998a). They are rejected, excluded and thrown into a kind of Hobbesian state of nature, either because they have never been part of any social contract and probably never will (I mean the pre-contractual underclasses everywhere in the world, the best example of which are probably the youth of urban ghettos); or because they have been excluded or thrown out of whatever social contract they had been part of before (I mean the post-contractual underclasses, millions of workers of post-Fordism, peasants after the collapse of land-reform projects or other development projects).

As a societal regime, fascism manifests itself as the collapse of the most trivial expectations of the people living under it. What we call society is a bundle of stabilized expectations from the subway schedule to the salary at the end of the month or employment at the end of college education. Expectations are stabilized by a set of shared scales and equivalences: for a given work a given pay, for a given crime a given punishment, for a given
risk a given insurance. The people who live under societal fascism are deprived of shared scales and equivalences and therefore of stabilized expectations. They live in a constant chaos of expectations in which the most trivial acts may be met with the most dramatic consequences. They run many risks and none of them is insured. Gualdino Jesus, a Pataxó Indian from Northeast Brazil, symbolizes the nature of such risks. He had come to Brasilia to take part in the march of the landless. The night was warm and he decided to sleep on a bench at the bus stop. In the early morning hours he was killed by three middle-class youths, one the son of a judge, another the son of an army officer. As the youngsters confessed later on to the police, they killed the Indian for the fun of it. They 'didn't even know he was an Indian, they thought he was a homeless vagrant'. This event is mentioned here as a parable of what I call societal fascism.

One possible future is therefore the spread of societal fascism. There are many signs that this is a real possibility. If the logic of the market is allowed to spill over from the economy to all fields of social life and to become the sole criterion for successful social and political interaction, society will become ungovernable and ethically repugnant and whatever order is achieved will be of a fascistic kind, as indeed Schumpeter (1962) and Polanyi (1957) predicted decades ago.

It is important, however, to bear in mind that, as my example shows, it is not just the state that may become fascistic; social relations – local, national and international relations – may also become so. The disjuncture in social relations between inclusion and exclusion has already gone so deep that it becomes increasingly a spatial disjuncture: included people live in civilized areas, excluded people in savage areas. Fences are raised between them (closed condominiums, gated communities). In the savage zones, because they are potentially ungovernable, the democratic state is democratically legitimated to act fascistically. This is more likely to occur the more the dominant consensus about the weak state is left unchecked. It is today becoming clear that only a strong democratic state can produce effectively its own weakness, and that only a strong democratic state can promote the emergence of a strong civil society. Otherwise, once the structural adjustment is accomplished, rather than with a weak state we will be confronted with strong mafias, as is today the case of Russia.

In this article I argue that the alternative to the spread of societal fascism is the construction of a new pattern of local, national and transnational relations, based both on the principle of redistribution (equality) and the principle of recognition (difference). In a globalized world, such relations must emerge as counter-hegemonic globalizations. The pattern sustaining them must be much more than a set of institutions. Such a pattern entails a new transnational political culture embedded in new forms of sociability and subjectivity. Ultimately it implies a new revolutionary ‘natural’ law, as revolutionary as the 17th-century conceptions of natural law were. For reasons that will soon become clear, I will call this new ‘natural’ law a baroque cosmopolitan law.
At the margins of the European American century, as I argue, another century, a truly new and American century, emerged. I call it the Nuestra American century. While the former carries the hegemonic globalization, the latter contains in itself the potential for counter-hegemonic globalizations. Since this potential lies in the future, the Nuestra America American century may well be the name of the century we are now entering. In the first section of my article I explain what I mean by globalization, and particularly counter-hegemonic globalization. Then I specify in some detail the most outstanding features of the idea of Nuestra America as it conceived of itself in the mirror of the European American century. In the following section I analyze the baroque ethos, conceived of as the cultural archetype of Nuestra America subjectivity and sociability. My analysis highlights some of the emancipatory potential of a new baroque ‘natural’ law, conceived of as cosmopolitan law, a law based neither on God nor on abstract nature, but rather on the social and political culture of social groups whose everyday life is energized by the need to transform survival strategies into sources of innovation, creativity, transgression and subversion. In the last sections of the article, I will try to show how this emancipatory counter-hegemonic potential of Nuestra America has so far not been realized, and how it may be realized in the 21st century. Finally, I identify five areas, all of them deeply embedded in the secular experience of Nuestra America, which in my view will be the main contested terrains of the struggle between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalizations, and thus the playing field for a new transnational political culture and the baroque ‘natural’ law that legitimates it. In each one of these contested terrains, the emancipatory potential of the struggles is premised upon the idea that a politics of redistribution cannot be successfully conducted without a politics of recognition, and vice versa.

On Counter-hegemonic Globalizations
Before I proceed, let me clarify what I mean by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalization. Most authors conceive of one form of globalization only, and reject the distinction between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalization. Once globalization is conceived of as being one alone, resistance to it on the part of its victims – granted that it may be possible to resist it at all – can only take the form of localization. Jerry Mander, for example, speaks of ‘ideas about the viability of smaller-scale, localized diversified economies, hooked into but not dominated by outside forces’ (1996: 18). Similarly Douthwaite affirms that:

[S]ince a local unsustainability cannot cancel local sustainability elsewhere, a sustainable world would consist of a number of territories, each of which would be sustainable independently of the others. In other words, rather than a single global economy which would damage everyone if it crashed, a sustainable world would contain a plethora of regional (sub-national) economies producing all the essentials of life from the resources of their territories and therefore largely independent of each other. (1999: 171)
According to this view, the shift toward the local is mandatory. It is the only way of guaranteeing sustainability.

I start from the assumption that what we usually call globalization consists of sets of social relations; as these sets of social relations change, so does globalization. There is strictly no single entity called globalization; there are, rather, globalizations, and we should use the term only in the plural. On the other hand, if globalizations are bundles of social relations, the latter are bound to involve conflicts, hence, both winners and losers. More often than not, the discourse on globalization is the story of the winners as told by the winners. Actually, the victory is apparently so absolute that the defeated end up vanishing from the picture altogether.

Here is my definition of globalization: it is the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as local.

The most important implications of this definition are the following. First, in the conditions of the Western capitalist world system there is no genuine globalization. What we call globalization is always the successful globalization of a given localism. In other words, there is no global condition for which we cannot find a local root, a specific cultural embeddedness. The second implication is that globalization entails localization, that is, localization is the globalization of the losers. In fact, we live in a world of localization, as much as we live in a world of globalization. Therefore, it would be equally correct in analytical terms if we were to define the current situation and our research topics in terms of localization, rather than globalization. The reason why we prefer the latter term is basically because hegemonic scientific discourse tends to prefer the story of the world as told by the winners. In order to account for the asymmetrical power relations within what we call globalization, I have suggested elsewhere that we distinguish four modes of production of globalization: globalized localisms, localized globalisms, cosmopolitanism, and common heritage of humankind (Santos, 1995: 252–377). According to this conception, the two first modes comprise what we call hegemonic globalization. They are driven by the forces of global capitalism and characterized by the radical nature of the global integration they make possible, either through exclusion or through inclusion. The excluded, whether people or countries, or even continents like Africa, are integrated in the global economy by the specific ways in which they are excluded from it. This explains why, among the millions of people who live on the streets, in urban ghettos, in reservations, in the killing fields of Urabá or Burundi, the Andean Mountains or the Amazonic frontier, in refugee camps, in occupied territories, in sweatshops using millions of bonded child labourers, there is much more in common than we are ready to admit.

The two others forms of globalization – cosmopolitanism and common heritage of humankind – are what I call counter-hegemonic globalizations. All over the world the hegemonic processes of exclusion are being met with different forms of resistance – grassroots initiatives, local organizations,
popular movements, transnational advocacy networks, new forms of labor internationalism - that try to counteract social exclusion, opening up spaces for democratic participation, community building, alternatives to dominant forms of development and knowledge, in sum, for social inclusion. These local–global linkages and cross-border activisms constitute a new transnational democratic movement. After the demonstrations in Seattle (November 1999) against the World Trade Organization and those in Prague (September 2000) against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, this movement is becoming a new component of international politics and, more generally, part of a new progressive political culture. The new local–global advocacy networks focus on a wide variety of issues: human rights, environment, ethnic and sexual discrimination, biodiversity, labor standards, alternative protection systems, indigenous rights, etc. (Casanova, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 1999; Brysk, 2000; Evans, 2000).

This new ‘activism beyond borders’ constitutes an emergent paradigm which, following Ulrich Beck, we could call a transnational, emancipatory sub-politics, the political Geist of counter-hegemonic globalizations. The credibility of the transnational sub-politics is still to be established, and its sustainability is an open question. If we measure its influence and success in light of the following four levels - issue creation and agenda setting; changes in the rhetoric of the decision-makers; institutional changes; effective impact on concrete policies - there is enough evidence to say that it has been successful in confronting hegemonic globalization at the two first levels of influence. It remains to be seen how successful it will be, and within what span of time, at the two last and more demanding levels of influence.

For the purposes of my argument in this article, two characteristics of transnational sub-politics must be highlighted at this point. The first one, a positive one, is that, contrary to the Western modern paradigms of progressive social transformation (revolution, socialism, social-democracy), the transnational sub-politics is as much involved in a politics of equality (redistribution) as in a politics of difference (recognition). This does not mean that these two kinds of politics are equally present in the different kinds of struggles, campaigns, and movements. Some struggles may privilege a politics of equality. This is the case of campaigns against sweatshops or of new movements of labor internationalism. Other struggles, on the contrary, may privilege a politics of difference, as is the case of some campaigns against racism and xenophobia in Europe or of some indigenous, aboriginal, and tribal rights movements in Latin America, Australia, New Zealand and India. Still other struggles may explicitly combine the politics of equality with the politics of difference. Such is the case of some other campaigns against racism and xenophobia in Europe, women’s movements throughout the world, and campaigns against the plundering of biodiversity (or biopiracy), most of it located in indigenous territories, as well as of most indigenous movements. The articulation between redistribution and recognition becomes far more visible once we look at these movements, initiatives, and campaigns as a new constellation of political and cultural emancipatory meanings in an
unevenly globalized world. So far, such meanings have not yet conquered their self-reflexivity. One of the purposes of this article is to point to one possible path toward this end.

The other characteristic of transnational sub-politics, a negative one, is that, so far, theories of separation have prevailed over theories of union among the great variety of existing movements, campaigns and initiatives. Indeed, truly global is only the logic of hegemonic globalization, poised to keep them separate and mutually unintelligible. For this reason, the notion of a counter-hegemonic globalization has a strong utopian component, and its full meaning can only be grasped through indirect procedures. I distinguish three main procedures: the sociology of absences, the theory of translation and Manifesto practices.

The sociology of absences is the procedure through which what does not exist, or whose existence is socially ungraspable or inexpressible, is conceived of as the active result of a given social process. The sociology of absences invents or unveils whatever social and political conditions, experiments, initiatives, conceptions have been successfully suppressed by hegemonic forms of globalization; or, rather than suppressed, have not been allowed to exist, to become pronounceable as a need or an aspiration. In the specific case of counter-hegemonic globalization, the sociology of absences is the procedure through which the incompleteness of particular anti-hegemonic struggles, as well as the inadequacy of local resistance in a globalized world, is constructed. Such incompleteness and inadequacy derive from the absent (suppressed, unimagined, discredited) links that might connect such struggles with other struggles elsewhere in the world, thus strengthening their potential to build credible counter-hegemonic alternatives. The more expertly the sociology of absences is performed, the greater the perception of incompleteness and inadequacy. At any rate, the universal and the global constructed by the sociology of absences, far from denying or eliminating the particular and the local, rather encourage them to envision what is beyond them as a condition of their successful resistance and possible alternatives.

Central to the sociology of absences is the notion that social experience is made up of social inexperience. This is taboo for the dominant classes that promote hegemonic capitalist globalization and its legitimizing cultural paradigm: on the one hand, Eurocentric modernity or what Scott Lash calls high modernity (1999), on the other, what I myself call celebratory postmodernity (1999b). The dominant classes have always taken as a given their particular experience of having to suffer the consequences of the ignorance, baseness or dangerousness of the dominated classes. Absent from their minds has always been their own inexperience of the suffering, humiliation and exploitation imposed upon the oppressed. The practice of the sociology of absences is what endows counter-hegemonic struggles with
cosmopolitanism, that is, openness towards the other and increased knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge Retamar has in mind when he asserts: 'There is only one type of person who really knows in its entirety the literature of Europe: the colonial' (1989: 28).

To bring about such openness, it is necessary to resort to a second procedure: the theory of translation. A given particular or local struggle (for instance, an indigenous or feminist struggle) only recognizes another (for instance, an environment or labor struggle) to the extent that both lose some of their particularism and localism. This occurs as mutual intelligibility between struggles is created. Mutual intelligibility is a prerequisite of what I would call the internal, self-reflexive mix of the politics of equality and the politics of difference among movements, initiatives, campaigns, networks. It is the lack of internal self-reflexivity that has allowed theories of separation to prevail over theories of union. Some movements, initiatives and campaigns rally around the principle of equality, others around the principle of difference. The theory of translation is the procedure that allows for mutual intelligibility. Unlike a general theory of transformative action, the theory of translation keeps intact the autonomy of the struggles in question as a condition for the translation, since only what is different can be translated. To render mutually intelligible means to identify what unites and is common to entities that are separate by their reciprocal differences. The theory of translation permits common ground to be identified in an indigenous struggle, a feminist struggle, an ecological struggle, etc., etc., without canceling out in any of them the autonomy and difference that sustain them.

Once it is identified, what unites and is common to different anti-hegemonic struggles becomes a principle of action only to the extent that it is identified as the solution for the incompleteness and inadequacy of the struggles that remain confined to their particularism and localism. This step occurs by means of Manifesto practices. I mean clear and unequivocal blueprints of alliances that are possible because based on common denominators, and mobilizing because yielding a positive sum, that is to say, because they grant specific advantages to all those participating in them and according to their degree of participation.

Thus conceived, transnational emancipatory sub-politics or counter-hegemonic globalization has demanding conditions. What one expects from it is a tense and dynamic equilibrium between difference and equality, between identity and solidarity, between autonomy and cooperation, between recognition and redistribution. The success of the above-mentioned procedures depends, therefore, on cultural, political and economic factors. In the 1980s, the 'cultural turn' contributed decisively to highlight the poles of difference, identity, autonomy and recognition, but it often did so in a culturalist way, that is to say, by playing down economic and political factors. Thus were the poles of equality, solidarity, cooperation and redistribution neglected. At the beginning of the new century, after almost 20 years of fierce neoliberal globalization, the balance between the two poles must be retrieved. From the perspective of an oppositional postmodernity, the idea
that there is no recognition without redistribution is central (Santos, 1998b: 121–39). Perhaps the best way to formulate this idea today is to resort to a modernist device, the notion of a fundamental meta-right: the right to have rights. We have the right to be equal whenever difference diminishes us; we have the right to be different whenever equality decharacterizes us. We have here a normative hybrid: it is modernist because based on an abstract universalism, but it is formulated in such a way as to sanction a postmodern opposition based on both redistribution and recognition.

As I have already said, the new constellations of meaning at work in transnational emancipatory sub-politics have not yet reached their self-reflexive moment. That this moment must occur, however, is crucial to the reinvention of political culture in the new century and millennium. The only way to encourage its emergence is by excavating the ruins of the marginalized, suppressed or silenced traditions upon which Eurocentric modernity built its own supremacy. They are another ‘another modernity’ (Lash, 1999).

To my mind, the Nuestra America American century has best formulated the idea of social emancipation based on the meta-right to have rights and on the dynamic equilibrium between recognition and redistribution presupposed by it. It has also most dramatically shown the difficulty of constructing successful emancipatory practices on that basis.

The Nuestra America American Century

‘Nuestra America’ is the title of a short essay by José Martí, published in the Mexican paper El Partido Liberal (30 January 1891). In this article, which is an excellent summary of Martian thinking to be found in several Latin American papers at the time, Martí expresses the set of ideas which I believe were to preside over the Nuestra America American century, a set of ideas later pursued by, among many others, Marietegui and Oswald de Andrade, Fernando Ortiz and Darcy Ribeiro.

The main ideas in this agenda are as follows. First, Nuestra America is at the antipodes of European America. It is the America mestiza founded at the often violent crossing of much European, Indian and African blood. It is the America that is capable of delving deeply into its own roots and from there to produce a knowledge and a government that are not imported, but rather adequate to its reality. Its deepest roots are the struggle of the Amerindian peoples against their invaders, where we find the true precursors of the Latin American independentistas (Retamar, 1989: 20). Asks Martí: ‘Is it not evident that America itself was paralysed by the same blow that paralysed the Indian?’ And he answers: ‘Until the Indian is caused to walk, America itself will not begin to walk well’ (1963, VIII: 336–7). Although in ‘Nuestra America’ Martí deals mainly with anti-Indian racism, elsewhere he refers also to black people: ‘A human being is more than white, more than mulatto, more than black. . . . Two kinds of racist would be equally guilty: the white racist and the black racist’ (1963, II: 299).

The second idea about Nuestra America is that its mixed roots gave rise
to infinite complexity, a new form of universalism that made the world richer. Says Martí: ‘There is no race hatred because there are no races’ (1963, VI: 22). In this sentence reverberates the same radical liberalism that had encouraged Simon Bolívar to proclaim that Latin America was ‘a small humankind’, a ‘miniature humankind’. This kind of situated and contextualized universalism was to become one of the most enduring leitmotifs of Nuestra America.

In 1928, the Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade published his Anthropophagous Manifesto. By anthropophagy he understood the American’s capacity to devour all that was alien to him and to incorporate all so as to create a complex identity, a new, constantly changing identity:

Only what is not mine interests me. The law of men. The law of the anthropophagous. . . . Against all importers of canned consciousness. The palpable existence of life. Pre-logical mentality for Mr. Levy-Bruhl to study. . . . I asked a man what is law. He said it is the guarantee of the exercise of possibility. This man’s name was Galli Mathias. I swallowed him. Anthropophagy. Absorption of the sacred enemy. To turn him to totem. The human adventure. Earthly finitude. However, only the pure elites managed to accomplish carnal anthropophagy, the one which carries with itself the highest meaning of life and avoids the evils identified by Freud, the catechetical evils. (Andrade, 1990: 47-51)

This concept of anthropophagy, ironic in itself in relation to the European representation of the ‘Carib instinct’, is quite close to the concept of transculturation developed by Fernando Ortiz in Cuba somewhat later (1940) (Ortiz, 1973). For a more recent example, I quote the Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro in a burst of brilliant humour:

It is quite easy to make an Australia: take a few French, English, Irish, and Italian people, throw them in a deserted island, they kill the Indians and make a second-rate England, damn it, or third-rate, that shit. Brazil has to realize that that is shit, Canada is shit, because it just repeats Europe. Just to show that ours is the adventure of making the new humankind, mestizaje in flesh and spirit. Mestizo is what is good. (1996: 104)

The third founding idea of Nuestra America is that for Nuestra America to be built upon its most genuine foundations, it has to endow itself with genuine knowledge. Martí again: ‘The trenches of ideas are worth more than the trenches of stone’ (1963, VI: 16). But, to accomplish this, ideas must be rooted in the aspirations of the oppressed peoples. Just as ‘the authentic mestizo has conquered the exotic Creole . . . , the imported book has been conquered in America by the natural man’ (1963, VI: 17). Hence Martí’s appeal:

The European university must yield to the American university. The history of America, from the Incas to the present, must be taught letter perfect, even if that of the Argonauts of Greece is not taught. Our own Greece is preferable
to that Greece that is not ours. We have greater need of it. National politicians must replace foreign and exotic politicians. Graft the world into our republics, but the trunk must be that of our republics. And let the conquered pedant be silent: there is no homeland of which the individual can be more proud than our unhappy American republics. (1963, VI: 18)

This situated knowledge, which demands a continuous attention to identity, behavior and involvement in public life, is truly what distinguishes a country, not the imperial attribution of levels of civilization. Martí distinguishes the intellectual from the man whom lived life’s experience has made wise. He says: ‘There is no fight between civilization and barbarism, rather between false erudition and nature’ (Martí, 1963, VI: 17).

Nuestra America thus carries a strong epistemological component. Rather than importing foreign ideas, one must find out about the specific realities of the continent from a Latin American perspective. Ignoring or disdaining them has helped tyrants to accede to power, as well as grounded the arrogance of the USA vis-à-vis the rest of the Continent.

The contempt of the formidable neighbor who does not know her is the major threat to Nuestra America; and he must know her urgently to stop disdaining her. Being ignorant, he might perhaps covet her. Once he knew her, he would, out of respect, take his hand off her. (Martí, 1963, VI: 22)

A situated knowledge is, therefore, the condition for a situated government. As Martí says elsewhere, one cannot:

. . . rule new peoples with a singular and violent composition, with laws inherited from four centuries of free practice in the United States, and nineteen centuries of monarchy in France. One does not stop the blow in the chest of the plainsman’s horse with one of Hamilton’s decrees. One does not clear the congealed blood of the Indian race with a sentence of Sieyès.

And Martí adds: ‘In the republic of Indians, governors learn Indian’ (Martí, 1963, VI: 16–17).

One fourth founding idea of Nuestra America is that it is Caliban’s American, not Prospero’s. Prospero’s America lies to the North, but it abides also in the South with those intellectual and political elites who reject Indian and black roots and look upon Europe and the USA as models to be imitated and upon their own countries with the ethnocentric blinders that distinguish civilization and barbaric wilderness. Martí has particularly in mind one of the earliest Southern formulations of Prospero’s America, the work of an Argentinian, Domingo Sarmiento, entitled Civilization and Barbarism published in 1845 (Sarmiento, 1966). It is against this world of Prospero that Andrade pushes with his ‘Carib instinct’:

However, it was not the Crusaders who came, but rather the runaways from a civilization we are now eating up, for we are strong and vengeful like the
Jabuti . . . We did not have speculation. But we did have divination. We had politics, which is the science of distribution. It is a social-planetary system. . . . Before the Portuguese discovered Brazil, Brazil had discovered happiness. (Andrade, 1990: 47–51)

The fifth basic idea of Nuestra America is that its political thinking, far from being nationalistic, is rather internationalistic, and is strengthened by an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stance, aimed at Europe in the past and now at the USA. Those who think that neoliberal globalization from NAFTA to the Initiative for the Americas and the World Trade Organization is something new should read Martí’s reports on the Pan-American Congress of 1889–90 and the American International Monetary Commission of 1891. Here are Martí’s remarks on the Pan-American Congress:

Never in America, since independence, was there subject matter demanding more wisdom, requiring more vigilance or calling for clearer and closer attention than the invitation that the powerful United States, filled with unsaleable products and determined to expand domination over America, addresses to the American nations with less power, linked by free, Europe-friendly trade, to form an alliance against Europe and cut off their contacts with the rest of the world. America managed to get rid of Spain’s tyranny; now, having looked with judicious eyes upon the antecedents causes and factors of such an invitation, it is imperative to state, because it is true, that the time has come for Spanish America to declare her second independence. (1963, VI: 4–6)

According to Martí, the dominant conceptions in the USA concerning Latin America must incite the latter to distrust all proposals coming from the North. Outraged, Martí accuses:

They believe in necessity, the barbaric right, as the only right, that ‘this will be ours because we need it’. They believe in incomparable superiority of the ‘Anglo-Saxon race as opposed to the Latin race’. They believe in the baseness of the negro race which they enslaved in the past and nowadays humiliate, and of the Indian race, which they exterminate. They believe that the peoples of Spanish America are mainly constituted of Indians and negroes. (Martí, 1963, VI: 160)

The fact that Nuestra America and European America are geographically so close, as well as the former’s awareness of the dangers issuing from the power imbalance between both, soon forced Nuestra América to claim her autonomy in the form of a thought and a practice from the South: ‘The North must be left behind’ (Martí, 1963, II: 368). Martí’s insight derives from his many years of exile in New York, during which he became well acquainted with ‘the monster’s entrails’:

In the North there is no support nor root. In the North the problems increase and there is no charity and patriotism to solve them. Here, men don’t learn how to love one another, nor do they love the soil where they are born by
chance. Here was set up a machine that deprives, more than it can gratify, the universal craving for products. Here are piled up the rich on one side and the desperate on the other. The North clams up and is full of hatred. The North must be left behind. (Martí, 1963, II: 368)

It would be difficult to find a more clairvoyant preview of the European American century, and the need to create an alternative to it.

According to Martí, such an alternative resides in a united Nuestra America and the assertion of her autonomy vis-a-vis the USA. In a text dated 1894, Martí writes: ‘Little is known about our sociology and about such precise laws as the following one: the farther away they keep from the USA, the freer and more prosperous will the peoples of America be’ (1963, VI: 26–7). More ambitious and utopian is Oswald de Andrade’s alternative: ‘We want the Caribbean Revolution greater than the French Revolution. One unification of all efficacious revolts on behalf of man. Without us, Europe would not even have its poor declaration of the rights of man’ (Andrade, 1990: 48).

In sum, for Martí the claim of equality grounds the struggle against unequal difference as much as the claim of difference grounds the struggle against the unequal equality. The only legitimate cannibalization of difference (Andrade’s anthropophagy) is the one of the subaltern because only through it can Caliban recognize his own difference vis-a-vis the unequal differences imposed upon him. In other words, Andrade’s anthropophagus digests according to his own guts.

The Baroque Ethos: Prolegomena for a New Cosmopolitan Law

Nuestra America is no mere intellectual construct for discussion in the salons that gave so much life to Latin American culture in the first decades of the 20th century. It is a political project, or rather, a set of political projects and a commitment to the objectives contained therein. That was the commitment that dragged Martí to exile and later to death fighting for Cuba’s independence. As Oswald de Andrade was to say epigrammatically: ‘Against the vegetal elites. In contact with the soil’ (Andrade, 1990: 49). But before it becomes a political project, Nuestra America is a form of subjectivity and sociability. It is a way of being and living permanently in transit and transitoriness, crossing borders, creating borderland spaces, used to risk – with which it has lived for many years, long before the invention of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) – used to enduring a very low level of stability of expectations in the name of a visceral optimism before collective potentiality. Such optimism led Martí to assert in a period of fin-de-siècle Vienna cultural pessimism: ‘A governor in a new nation means a creator’ (1963, VI: 17). The same kind of optimism made Andrade exclaim: ‘Joy is counter proof’ (1990: 51).

The subjectivity and sociability of Nuestra America are uncomfortable with institutionalized, legalistic thought and comfortable with utopian thinking. By utopia I mean the exploration by imagination of new modes of human
possibility and styles of will, and the confrontation by imagination of the
necessity of whatever exists - just because it exists - on behalf of something
radically better that is worth fighting for, and to which humanity is fully en-
titled (Santos, 1995: 479). This style of subjectivity and sociability is what
I call, following Echeverría (1994), the baroque ethos. 4

Whether as an artistic style or as an historical epoch, the baroque is
most specifically a Latin and Mediterranean phenomenon, an eccentric form
of modernity, the South of the North, so to speak. Its eccentricity derives, to
a large extent, from the fact that it occurred in countries and at historical
moments in which the center of power was weak and tried to hide its weak-
ness by dramatizing conformist sociability. The relative lack of central power
endows the baroque with an open-ended and unfinished character that
allows for the autonomy and creativity of the margins and peripheries.
Because of its eccentricity and exaggeration, the center reproduces itself as
if it were a margin. I mean a centrifugal imagination which becomes stronger
as we go from the internal peripheries of the European power to its external
peripheries in Latin America. The whole of Latin America was colonized by
weak centers, Portugal and Spain. Portugal was a hegemonic center during
a brief period of time, between the 15th and the 16th centuries, and Spain
started to decline but a century later. From the 17th century onwards, the
colonies were more or less left alone, a marginalization that made possible
a specific cultural and social creativity, now highly codified, now chaotic,
now erudite, now vernacular, now official, now illegal. Such mestizaje is so
deeply rooted in the social practices of these countries that it came to be
considered as grounding a cultural ethos that is typically Latin American
and has prevailed from the 17th century to the present. This form of baroque,
insmuch as it is the manifestation of an extreme instance of the center's
weakness, constitutes a privileged field for the development of a centrifugal,
subversive and blasphemous imagination.

As an epoch in European history, the baroque is a time of crisis and
transition. I mean the economic, social and political crisis that is particularly
obvious in the case of the powers that fostered the first phase of European
expansion. In Portugal's case, the crisis implies even loss of independence.
For reasons to do with the monarchic succession, Portugal was annexed to
Spain in 1580, and only regained its independence in 1640. The Spanish
monarchy, particularly under Felipe IV (1621–65), underwent a serious
financial crisis that was actually also a political and cultural crisis. As
Maravall has pointed out, it begins as a certain awareness of uneasiness and
restlessness, which 'gets worse as the social fabric is seriously affected'
(1990: 57). For instance, values and behaviors are questioned, the structure
of classes undergoes some changes, banditism and deviant behavior in
general increase, revolt and sedition are constant threats. It is indeed a time
of crisis, but a time also of transition towards new modes of sociability made
possible by the emergent capitalism and the new scientific paradigm, as well
as towards new modes of political domination based not only on coercion,
but also on cultural and ideological integration. To a large extent, baroque
culture is one such instrument of consolidation and legitimation of power. What nonetheless seems to me inspiring in baroque culture is its grain of subversion and eccentricity, the weakness of the centers of power that look for legitimation in it, the space of creativity and imagination it opens up, the turbulent sociability that it fosters. The configuration of baroque subjectivity that I wish to advance here is a collage of diverse historical and cultural materials, some of which in fact cannot be considered technically as belonging to the baroque period.

Baroque subjectivity lives comfortably with the temporary suspension of order and canons. As a subjectivity of transition, it depends both on the exhaustion and the aspiration of canons; its privileged temporality is perennial transitoriness. It lacks the obvious certainties of universal laws - in the same way that baroque style lacked the classical universalism of the Renaissance. Because it is unable to plan its own repetition ad infinitum, baroque subjectivity invests in the local, the particular, the momentary, the ephemeral and the transitory. But the local is not lived in a localist fashion, that is, it is not experienced as an orthotopia; the local aspires, rather, to invent another place, a heterotopia, or even a utopia. Since it derives from a deep feeling of emptiness and disorientation caused by the exhaustion of the dominant canons, the comfort provided by the local is not the comfort of rest, but a sense of direction. Again, we can observe here a contrast with the Renaissance, as Wölfflin has taught us: ‘In contrast to the Renaissance, which sought permanence and repose in everything, the baroque had from the first moment a definite sense of direction’ (Wölfflin, 1979: 67).

Baroque subjectivity is contemporaneous with all the elements that it integrates, and hence contemptuous of modernist evolutionism. Thus, we might say, baroque temporality is the temporality of interruption. Interruption is important on two accounts: it allows for reflexivity and surprise. Reflexivity is the self-reflexivity required by the lack of maps (without maps to guide our steps, we must tread with double care). Without self-reflexivity, in a desert of canons, the desert itself becomes canonical. Surprise, in turn, is really suspense; it derives from the suspension accomplished by interruption. By momentarily suspending itself, baroque subjectivity intensifies the will and arouses passion. The ‘baroque technique’, argues Maravall, consists in ‘suspending resolution so as to encourage it, after that provisional and transitory moment of arrest, to push further more efficiently with the help of those retained and concentrated forces’ (Maravall, 1990: 445).

Interruption provokes wonder and novelty, and impedes closure and completion. Hence the unfinished and open-ended character of baroque sociability. The capacity for wonder, surprise and novelty is the energy that facilitates the struggle for an aspiration all the more convincing because it can never be completely fulfilled. The aim of baroque style, says Wölfflin, ‘is not to represent a perfect state, but to suggest an incomplete process and a moment towards its completion’ (Wölfflin, 1979: 67).

Baroque subjectivity has a very special relationship with forms.
geometry of baroque subjectivity is not Euclidean; it is fractal. Suspension
of forms results from the extreme uses to which they are put: Maravall’s
extremosidad (Maravall, 1990: 421). As regards baroque subjectivity, forms
are the exercise of freedom par excellence. The great importance of the exer-
cise of freedom justifies that forms be treated with extreme seriousness,
though the extremism may result in the destruction of the forms themselves.
The reason why Michelangelo is rightly considered one of baroque’s fore-
fathers is, according to Wölfflin, ‘because he treated forms with a violence,
a terrible seriousness which could only find expression in formlessness’
(Wölfflin, 1979: 82). This is what Michelangelo’s contemporaries called
terribilità. The extremism in the use of forms is grounded on a will to
grandiosity that is also the will to astound so well formulated by Bernini:
‘Let no one speak to me of what is small’ (Tapié, 1988, II: 188). Extremism
may be exercised in many different ways, to highlight simplicity, or even
asceticism, as well as exuberance and extravagance, as Maravall has pointed
out. Baroque extremism allows for ruptures emerging out of apparent conti-
uities and keeps the forms in a permanently unstable state of bifurcation,
in Prigogine’s terms (1996). One of the most eloquent examples is Bernini’s
The Mystical Ecstasy of Santa Teresa. In this sculpture, St Teresa’s expres-
sion is dramatized in such a way that the most intensely religious represen-
tation of the saint is one with the profane representation of a woman enjoying
a deep orgasm. The representation of the scared glides surreptitiously into
the representation of the sacrilegious. Extremism of forms alone allows
baroque subjectivity to entertain the turbulence and excitement necessary
to continue the struggle for emancipatory causes, in a world in which
emancipation has been collapsed into or absorbed by hegemonic regulation.
To speak of extremism is to speak of archeological excavation into the regu-
latory magma in order to retrieve emancipatory fires, no matter how dim.
The same extremism that produces forms, also devours them. This
voracity takes on two forms: sfumato and mestizaje. In baroque painting,
sfumato is the blurring of outlines and colors amongst objects, as clouds and
mountains, or the sea and the sky. Sfumato allows baroque subjectivity to
create the near and the familiar among different intelligibilities, thus making
cross-cultural dialogues possible and desirable. For instance, only resorting
to sfumato is it possible to give form to configurations that combine Western
human rights with other conceptions of human dignity existing in other cul-
tures (Santos, 1999a). The coherence of monolithic constructions disinte-
grates, its free-floating fragments remain open to new coherences and
inventions of new multicultural forms. Sfumato is like a magnet that attracts
the fragmentary forms into new constellations and directions, appealing to
their most vulnerable, unfinished, open-ended contours. Sfumato is, in sum,
an antifortress militancy.
Mestizaje, in its turn, is a way of pushing sfumato to its utmost, or
extreme. While sfumato operates through disintegration of forms and
retrieval of fragments, mestizaje operates through the creation of new forms
of constellations of meaning, which are truly unrecognizable or blasphemous
in light of their constitutive fragments. Mestizaje resides in the destruction of the logic that presides over the formation of each of its fragments, and in the construction of a new logic. This productive-destructive process tends to reflect the power relations among the original cultural forms (that is, among their supporting social groups) and this is why baroque subjectivity favors the mestizajes in which power relations are replaced by shared authority (mestiza authority). Latin America has provided a particularly fertile soil for mestizaje, and so the region is one of the most important excavation sites for the construction of baroque subjectivity.5

Sfumato and mestizaje are the two constitutive elements of what I call, following Fernando Ortiz, transculturation. In his justly famous book, Contrapunteo Cubano, originally published in 1940, Ortiz proposes the concept of transculturation to define the synthesis of the utterly intricate cultural processes of deculturation and neoculturation that have always characterized Cuban society. In his thinking, the reciprocal cultural shocks and discoveries, which in Europe occurred slowly throughout more than four millennia, occurred in Cuba in sudden jumps over less than four centuries (1973: 131). The pre-Colombian transculturations between paleolithic and neolithic Indians were followed by many others after the European ‘hurricane’, amongst various European cultures and between those and various African and Asian cultures. According to Ortiz, what distinguishes Cuba, from the 16th century on, is the fact that its cultures and peoples were all equally invaders, exogenous, all of them torn away from their original cradle, haunted by separation and transplantation to the new culture that was being created (1973: 132). This permanent maladjustment and transitoriness allowed for new cultural constellations which cannot be reduced to the sum of the different fragments that contributed to them. The positive character of this constant process of transition between cultures is what Ortiz designates as transculturation. To reinforce this positive, new character, I prefer to speak of sfumato instead of deculturation and mestizaje instead of neoculturation. Transculturation designates, therefore, the voraciousness and extremism with which cultural forms are processed by baroque sociability. This self-same voraciousness and self-same extremism are also quite present in Oswald de Andrade’s concept of anthropophagy.

The extremism with which forms are lived by baroque subjectivity stresses the rhetorical artifactuality of practices, discourses and modes of intelligibility. Artifice (artificium) is the foundation of a subjectivity suspended among fragments. Artifice allows baroque subjectivity to reinvent itself whenever the sociabilities it leads to tend to transform themselves into micro-orthodoxies. Through artifice, baroque subjectivity is lucid and subversive at the same time, as the baroque feast so well illustrates. The importance of the feast in baroque culture, both in Europe and in Latin America, is well documented.5 The feast turned baroque culture into the first instance of mass culture of modernity. Its ostentatious and celebratory character was used by political and ecclesiastical powers to dramatize their greatness and reinforce their control over the masses. However, through its three basic
components – disproportion, laughter and subversion – the baroque feast is invested with an emancipatory potential.

The baroque feast is out of proportion: it requires an extremely large investment which, however, is consumed in an extremely fleeting moment and an extremely limited space. As Maravall says, ‘abundant and expensive means are used, a considerable effort is exerted, ample preparations are made, a complicated apparatus is set up, all that only to obtain some extremely short-lived effects, whether in the form of pleasure or surprise’ (Maravall, 1990: 488). Nevertheless, disproportion generates a special intensification that, in turn, gives rise to the will to motion, the tolerance for chaos and the taste for turbulence, without which the struggle for the paradigmatic transition cannot take place.

Disproportion makes wonder, surprise, artifice and novelty possible. But above all, it makes playful distance and laughter possible. Because laughter is not easily codifiable, capitalist modernity declared war on mirth, and so laughter was considered frivolous, improper, eccentric, if not blasphemous. Laughter was to be admitted only in highly codified contexts of the entertainment industry. This phenomenon can also be observed among modern anti-capitalist social movements (labor parties, unions and even the new social movements) that banned laughter and play, lest they subvert the seriousness of resistance. Particularly interesting is the case of unions, whose activities at the beginning had a strong ludic and festive element (workers’ feasts) which, however, was gradually suffocated, until at last union activity became deadly serious and deeply anti-erotic. The banishment of laughter and play is part of what Max Weber calls the Entzäuberung of the modern world.

The reinvention of social emancipation, which I suggest can be achieved by delving into baroque sociability, aims at the re-enchantment of common sense, which in itself presupposes the carnivalization of emancipatory social practices and the eroticism of laughter and play. As Oswald de Andrade said: ‘Joy is counter proof’ (1990: 51). The carnivalization of emancipatory social practice has an important self-reflexive dimension: it makes the decanonization and subversion of such practices possible. A decanonizing practice which does not know how to decanonize itself, falls easily into orthodoxy. Likewise, a subversive activity which does not know how to subvert itself, falls easily into regulatory routine.

And now, finally, the third emancipatory feature of the baroque feast: subversion. By carnivалиzing social practices, the baroque feast displays a subversive potential that increases as the feast distances itself from the centers of power, but that is always there, even when the centers of power themselves are the promoters of the feast. Little wonder, then, that this subversive feature was much more noticeable in the colonies. Writing about carnival in the 1920s, the great Peruvian intellectual Marietegui asserted that, even though it had been appropriated by the bourgeoisie, carnival was indeed revolutionary, because, by turning the bourgeois into a wardrobe, it was a merciless parody of power and the past (Marietegui, 1974: 127).
Garcia de León also describes the subversive dimension of baroque feasts and religious processions in the Mexican port of Vera Cruz in the 17th century. Up front marched the highest dignitaries of the viceroyalty in their full regalia - politicians, clergymen and military men; at the end of the procession followed the populace, mimicking their betters in gesture and attire, and thus provoking laughter and merriment among the spectators (Leon, 1993). This symmetrical inversion of the beginning and end of the procession is a cultural metaphor for the upside-down world - el mundo al revés - which was typical of Vera Cruz sociability at the time: ‘mulattas’ dressed up as queens, slaves in silk garments, whores pretending to be honest women and honest women pretending to be whores; Africanized Portuguese and Indianized Spaniards. The same mundo al revés is celebrated by Oswald de Andrade in his Anthropophagous Manifesto: ‘But we have never admitted to the birth of logic among us. . . . Only where there is mystery is there no determinism. But what have we to do with this? We have never been catechized. We live in a sleepwalking law. We made Christ be born in Bahia. Or in Belém-Pará’ (Andrade, 1990: 48).

In the feast, subversion is codified, in that it transgresses order while knowing the place of order and not questioning it, but the code itself is subverted by the sfumatos between feast and daily sociability. In the peripheries, transgression is almost a necessity. It is transgressive because it does not know how to be order, even as it knows that order exists. That is why baroque subjectivity privileges margins and peripheries as fields for the reconstruction of emancipatory energies.

All these characteristics turn the sociability generated by baroque subjectivity into a subcodified sociability: somewhat chaotic, inspired by a centrifugal imagination, positioned between despair and vertigo, this is a kind of sociability that celebrates revolt and revolutionizes celebration. Such sociability cannot but be emotional and passionate, the feature that most distinguishes baroque subjectivity from high modernity, or first modernity in Lash’s terms (1999). High modern rationality, particularly after Descartes, condemns the emotions and the passions as obstacles to the progress of knowledge and truth. Cartesian rationality, says Toulmin, claims to be ‘intellectually perfectionist, morally rigorous and humanly unrelenting’ (Toulmin, 1990: 198). Not much of human life and social practice fits into such a conception of rationality, but it is nonetheless quite attractive to those who cherish the stability and hierarchy of universal rules.

Hirschman, in his turn, has clearly shown the elective affinities between this form of rationality and emergent capitalism. Inasmuch as the interests of people and groups began centering around economic advantage, the interests that before had been considered passions became the opposite of passions and even the tamers of passion. From then on, says Hirschman, ‘in the pursuit of their interests men were expected or assumed to be steadfast, single-minded and methodical, in total contrast to the stereotyped behavior of men who are buffeted and blinded by their passions’ (Hirschman, 1977: 54). The objective was, of course, to create a ‘one-dimensional’ human
personality. And Hirschman concludes: ‘[I]n sum, capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature’ (1977: 132).

Cartesian and capitalist recipes are of little use for the reconstruction of a human personality with the capacity and desire for social emancipation. The meaning of the emancipatory struggles at the beginning of the 21st century can neither be deduced from demonstrative knowledge nor from an estimate of interests. Thus, the excavation undertaken by baroque subjectivity in this domain, more than in any other, must concentrate on suppressed or eccentric traditions of modernity, representations that occurred in the physical or symbolic peripheries where the control of hegemonic representations was weaker – the Vera Cruzes of modernity – or earlier, more chaotic representations of modernity that occurred before the Cartesian closure. For example, baroque subjectivity looks for inspiration in Montaigne and the concrete and erotic intelligibility of his life. In his essay ‘On Experience’, after saying that he hates remedies that are more troublesome than the disease, Montaigne writes:

> To be a victim of the colic and to subject oneself to abstinence from the pleasure of eating oysters, are two evils instead of one. The disease stabs us on one side, the diet on the other. Since there is the risk of mistake let us take it, for preference, in the pursuit of pleasure. The world does the opposite, and considers nothing to be useful that is not painful; facility rouses suspicions. (Montaigne, 1958: 370)

As Cassirer (1960, 1963) and Toulmin (1990) have shown for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment respectively, each era creates a subjectivity that is congruent with the new intellectual, social, political and cultural challenges. The baroque ethos is the building block of a form of subjectivity and sociability interested in and capable of confronting the hegemonic forms of globalization, thereby opening the space for counter-hegemonic possibilities. Such possibilities are not fully developed and cannot by themselves promise a new era. But they are consistent enough to provide the grounding for the idea that we are entering a period of paradigmatic transition, an in-between era and therefore an era that is eager to follow the impulse of mestizaje, sfumato, hybridization and all the other features that I have attributed to the baroque ethos, and hence to Nuestra America. The progressive credibility conquered by the forms of subjectivity and sociability nurtured by such ethos will gradually translate into new interstitial normativities. Both Martí and Andrade have in mind a new kind of law and a new kind of rights. For them the right to be equal involves the right to be different, as the right to be different involves the right to be equal. Andrade’s metaphor of anthropophagy is a call for such a complex inter-legality. It is formulated from the perspective of subaltern difference, the only ‘other’ recognized by Eurocentric high modernity. The interstitial normative fragments we collect in Nuestra America will provide the seeds...
for a new ‘natural’ law, a cosmopolitan law, a law from below, to be found in the streets where survival and creative transgression fuse in an everyday-life pattern.

In the following I will elaborate on this new normativity in which redistribution and recognition come together to build the new emancipatory blueprints which I have called New Manifestos. But before that I want to dwell for a moment on the difficulties confronted by the Nuestra America project throughout the 20th century. They will help to illuminate the emancipatory tasks ahead.

Counter-Hegemony in the 20th Century

The Nuestra America American century was a century of counter-hegemonic possibilities, many of them following the tradition of others in the 19th century after the independence of Haiti in 1804. Amongst such possibilities, we might count the Mexican Revolution of 1910; the Indigenous movement headed by Quintin Lame in Colombia, 1914; the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s, and its triumph in the 1980s; the radical democratization of Guatemala in 1944; the rise of Peronism in 1946; the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959; Allende’s rise to power in 1970; the Landless Movement in Brazil since the 1980s; the Zapatista Movement in Mexico since 1994.

The overwhelming majority of these emancipatory experiences were aimed against the European American century or, at least, had for their background the latter’s political ambitions and hegemonic ideas. Indeed, the training ground for American, neoliberal, hegemonic globalization, which nowadays spreads throughout the entire globe, was in Nuestra America from the beginning of the 20th century. Not allowed to be the New World on the same footing with European America, Nuestra America was forced to be the Newest World of the European America. This poisoned privilege turned Nuestra America into a fertile field of cosmopolitan, emancipatory, counter-hegemonic experiences, as exhilarating as painful, as radiant in their promises as frustrating in their fulfillments.

What failed and why in the Nuestra America American century? It would be silly to propose an inventory before such an open future as ours. Nonetheless, I’ll risk a few thoughts, which actually claim to account more for the future than the past. In the first place, to live in the ‘monster’s entrails’ is no easy matter. It does allow a deep knowledge of the beast, as Martí so well demonstrates, but, on the other hand, it makes it very difficult to come out alive, even when one heeds Martí’s admonishment: ‘The North must be left behind’ (Martí, 1963, II: 368). In my way of thinking, Nuestra America has been doubly living in the monster’s entrails: because it shares with European America the continent that the latter had always conceived of as its vital space and zone of privileged influence; because, as Martí says in ‘Nuestra America’, ‘nuestra America is the working America’ (1963, VI: 23) and, thus, in its relations with European America, it shares the same
tensions and sorrows that plague the relations between workers and capitalists. In this latter sense, Nuestra America has failed no more, no less than the workers of all the world in their struggle against capital.

My second thought is that Nuestra America did not have to fight only against the imperial incursions of its northern neighbor. The latter took over and became at home in the South, not just socializing with the natives but becoming a very native in the form of local elites and their transnational alliances with US interests. The Southern Prospero was present in Sarmiento’s political-cultural project, in the interests of agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie, specially after the Second World War, in the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, in the fight against the communist threat and in the drastic neoliberal structural adjustment. In this sense, Nuestra America had to live trapped in and dependent on European America, just like Caliban vis-a-vis Prospero. That is why Latin American violence has taken the form of civil war much more often than the form of the Bay of Pigs.

The third thought concerns the absence of hegemony in the counter-hegemonic field. While it is a crucial instrument of class domination in complex societies, the concept of hegemony is equally crucial inside the struggles against such domination. Among the oppressed or dominated groups one must emerge, capable of converting its specific interests in liberation into the common interests of all the oppressed, and thus become hegemonic. Gramsci, we recall, was convinced that the workers constituted the group in question. We do know that things did not happen like that in the capitalist world, less so today than in Gramsci’s own time, and far less so in Nuestra America than in Europe or European America. Indigenous, peasants, workers, petit bourgeois, black movements and struggles always occurred in isolation, antagonizing one another, ever without a theory of translation and devoid of the Manifesto practices referred to above. One of the weaknesses of Nuestra America, actually quite obvious in Martí’s work, was to overestimate the communality of interests and the possibilities of uniting around them. Rather than uniting, Nuestra America underwent a process of Balkanization. Before this fragmentation, the union of European America became more efficacious. European America united around the idea of national identity and manifest destiny: a promised land destined to fulfill its promises at any cost for the outsiders.

My final thought concerns the cultural project of Nuestra America itself. To my mind, contrary to Martí’s wishes, the European and North American university never gave entirely way to the American university. As witness the

... pathetic bovarism of writers and scholars ... which leads some Latin Americans ... to imagine themselves as exiled metropolitans. For them, a work produced in their immediate orbit ... merits their interest only when it has received the metropolis’ approval, an approval that gives them the eyes with which to see it. (Retamar, 1989: 82)
Contrary to Ortiz’s claim, transculturation was never total, and in fact it was undermined by power differences among the different components that contributed to it. For a very long time, and perhaps more so today at a time of vertiginous deterritorialized transculturation in the guise of hybridization, the questions about the inequality of power remained unanswered: who hybridizes whom and what? With what results? And for whose benefit? What, in the process of transculturation, did not go beyond deculturation or sfumato and why? If indeed it is true that most cultures were invaders, it is no less true that some invaded as masters, some as slaves. It is perhaps not risky today, 60 years later, to think that Oswald de Andrade’s anthropophagous optimism was exaggerated: ‘But no Crusaders came. Only runaways from a civilization which we are eating up, because we are strong and vengeful like the jabuti’ (Andrade, 1990: 50).

The European American century ended triumphantly, the protagonist of the last incarnation of the capitalist world system – hegemonic globalization. On the contrary, the Nuestra America American century ended sorrowfully. Latin America has imported many of the evils that Martí had seen in the monster’s entrails, and the enormous emancipatory creativity it has demonstrated – as witness the Zapata and Sandino movements, the indigenous and peasant movements, Allende in 1970 and Fidel in 1959, the social movements, the ABC trade unions movement, the participatory budgeting in many Brazilian cities, the landless movement, the Zapatist movement – either ended in frustration or face an uncertain future. This uncertainty is all the greater since it is foreseeable that extreme polarization in the distribution of world wealth during the last decades, should it go on, will require an even more despotic system of repression worldwide than currently exists. With remarkable forethought, Darcy Ribeiro wrote in 1979: ‘The means of repression required to maintain this system threaten to impose upon all the peoples such rigid and despotically efficient regimes as are without parallel in the history of iniquity’ (1979: 40). It comes as no surprise that the intellectual and social climate of Latin America has been invaded in the past decades by a wave of cynical reason, a cultural pessimism utterly unrecognizable from the point of view of Nuestra America.

**Counter-Hegemonic Possibilities for the 21st Century: Towards New Manifestos**

In the light of the preceding, the question must be asked whether Nuestra America can in fact continue to symbolize a utopian will to emancipation and counter-hegemonic globalization, based on the mutual implication of equality and difference. My answer is positive but depending on the following condition: Nuestra America must be deterritorialized and turned into the metaphor for the struggle of the victims of hegemonic globalization wherever they may be, North or South, East or West. If we revisit the founding ideas of Nuestra America, we observe that the transformations of the last decades have created the conditions for them to occur and flourish today in other
parts of the world. Let us examine some of them. First, the exponential increase of transborder interactions—of emigrants, students, refugees, as well as executives, tourists—is giving rise to new forms of mestizaje, anthropophagy and transculturation all over the world. The world becomes increasingly a world of invaders cut off from an origin they never had or, if they did, where they suffered the original experience of being invaded. Against celebratory postmodernism, more attention must be paid than was paid in the first century of Nuestra America to the power of the different participants in the processes of mestizaje. Such inequalities accounted for the perversion both of the politics of difference (recognition became a form of miscognition) and the politics of equality (redistribution ended up as the new forms of poor relief advocated by the World Bank and IMF).

Second, the recent ugly revival of racism in the North points to an aggressive defense against the unstoppable construction of the multiple little humankinds Bolivar talked about, where races cross and interpenetrate in the margins of repression and discrimination. As the Cuban, in Marti’s voice, could proclaim to be more than black, mulatto or white, so the South African, the Mozambican, the New Yorker, the Parisian, the Londoner can proclaim today to be more than black, white, mulatto, Indian, Kurd, Arab, etc., etc.

Third, the demand to produce or sustain situated and contextualized knowledge is today a global claim against the ignorance and silencing effect produced by modern science as it is used by hegemonic globalization. This epistemological issue gained enormous relevance in recent times with the newest developments of biotechnology and genetic engineering and the consequent struggle to defend biodiversity from biopiracy. In this domain, Latin America, one of the great stores of biodiversity, continues to be the home of Nuestra America but many other countries are in this position, in Africa or Asia. Fourth, as hegemonic globalization deepened, the ‘entrails of the monster’ have drawn closer to many other peoples in other continents. The closeness effect is today produced by information and communication capitalism and by consumer society. Hereby are multiplied both the grounds for the cynical reason and the postcolonial impulse. No other counter-hegemonic internationalism seems to loom on the horizon, but chaotic and fragmentary internationalisms have become part of our quotidian life. In a word, the new Nuestra America is today in a condition to globalize itself and thereby propose new emancipatory alliances to the old Nuestra America, since localized.

The counter-hegemonic nature of Nuestra America lies in its potential to develop a progressive transnational political culture. Such a political culture will concentrate on (1) identifying the multiple local/global linkages among struggles, movements and initiatives; (2) promoting the clashes between hegemonic globalization trends and pressures, on one side, and the transnational coalitions to resist against them, on the other, thus opening up possibilities for counter-hegemonic globalizations; (3) promoting internal and external self-reflexivity so that the forms of redistribution and recognition that are established among the movements mirror the forms of redistribution and
recognition that transnational emancipatory sub-politics wishes to see implemented in the world.

Towards New Manifestos

In 1998 the Communist Manifesto celebrated its 150th anniversary. The Manifesto is one of the landmark texts of Western modernity. In a few pages and with unsurpassed clarity, Marx and Engels offer there a global view of society in their own time, a general theory of historical development, and a short- and long-term political program. The Manifesto is a Eurocentric document that conveys an unswerving faith in progress, acclaims the bourgeoisie as the revolutionary class that made it possible, and by the same token prophesies the defeat of the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the proletariat as the emergent class capable of guaranteeing the continuity of progress beyond bourgeois limits.

Some of the themes, analyses and appeals included in the Manifesto are still up to date. However, Marx’s prophecies were never fulfilled. Capitalism did not succumb at the hands of the enemies it created itself and the communist alternative failed utterly. Capitalism globalized itself far more effectively than the proletarian movement, while the latter’s successes, namely in the more developed countries, consisted in humanizing, rather than overcoming, capitalism.

Nonetheless, the social evils denounced by the Manifesto are today as grievous as then. The progress achieved in the mean time has gone hand in hand with wars that killed and go on killing millions of people, and the gap between the rich and the poor has never before been so wide as today. As I mentioned above, in the face of such a reality, I believe that it is necessary to create the conditions for not one but several new Manifestos to emerge, with the potential to mobilize all the progressive forces of the world. By progressive forces are meant all those unreconciled with the spread of societal fascism, which they do not see as inevitable, and who therefore go on fighting for alternatives. The complexity of the contemporary world and the increasing visibility of its great diversity and inequality render impossible the translation of principles of action into one single manifesto. I have therefore in mind several manifestos, each one of them opening up possible paths toward an alternative society vis-a-vis societal fascism.

Moreover, unlike the Communist Manifesto, the new manifestos will not be the achievement of individual scientists observing the world from one privileged perspective alone. Rather, they will be far more multicultural and indebted to different paradigms of knowledge, and will emerge, by virtue of translation, networking and mestizaje, in ‘conversations of humankind’ (John Dewey) involving social scientists and activists engaged in social struggles all over the world.

The new Manifestos must focus on those themes and alternatives that carry more potential to build counter-hegemonic globalizations in the next decades. In my view, the five following themes are the most important ones in this respect. In regard to each one of them, Nuestra America provides a
vast field of historical experience. Nuestra America thus emerges as the most privileged site where the challenges posed by the emergent transnational political culture can be confronted. I here enumerate the five themes in no order of precedence.

1. **Participatory Democracy.** Along with the hegemonic model of democracy (liberal, representative democracy), other, subaltern models of democracy have always coexisted, no matter how marginalized or discredited. We live in paradoxical times: at the very moment of its most convincing triumphs across the globe, liberal democracy becomes less and less credible and convincing, not only in the ‘new frontier’ countries but also in the countries where it has its deepest roots. The twin crises of representation and participation are the most visible symptoms of such deficit of credibility and, in the last instance, of legitimacy. On the other hand, local, regional and national communities in different parts of the world are undertaking democratic experiments and initiatives, based on alternative models of democracy, in which the tensions between capitalism and democracy and between redistribution and recognition become alive and turn into positive energy behind new, more comprehensive and more just social contracts, no matter how locally circumscribed they may be. In some countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, traditional forms of authority and self-government are being revisited to explore the possibility of their internal transformation and articulation with other forms of democratic rule.

2. **Alternative Production Systems.** A market economy is of course possible and, within limits, even desirable. On the contrary, a market society is impossible and, if possible, would be morally repugnant, and indeed ungovernable. Nothing short of societal fascism. One possible response to societal fascism is alternative production systems. Discussions about counter-hegemonic globalization tend to focus on social, political and cultural initiatives, only rarely focusing on the economic ones, that is, on local/global initiatives consisting of non-capitalist production and distribution of goods and services, whether in rural or urban settings: cooperatives, mutualities, credit systems, farming of invaded land by landless peasants, sustainable water systems and fishing communities, ecological logging, etc. These initiatives are those in which local/global linkages are most difficult to establish, if for no other reason than because they confront more directly the logic of global capitalism that lies behind hegemonic globalization, not only at the level of production but also at the level of distribution. Another important facet of alternative production systems is that they are never exclusively economic in nature. They mobilize social and cultural resources in such a way as to prevent the reduction of social value to market price.

3. **Emancipatory Multicultural Justices and Citizenships.** The crisis of Western modernity has shown that the failure of progressive projects concerning the improvement of life chances and life conditions of subordinate groups both inside and outside the Western world was in part due to lack of cultural legitimacy. This applies even to human rights movements
since the universality of human rights cannot be taken for granted (Santos, 1999a). The idea of human dignity can be formulated in different ‘languages’. Rather than being suppressed in the name of postulated universalisms, such differences must be mutually intelligible through translation and what I call diatopical hermeneutics. By diatopical hermeneutics I understand an interpretation of isomorphic concerns of different cultures conducted by partners who are able and willing to argue with one foot in one culture and the other foot in another (Santos, 1995: 340–2).

Since modern nation-building was accomplished more often than not by smashing the cultural and national identity of minorities (and sometimes even majorities), the recognition of multiculturalism and of multinationhood carries with it the aspiration to self-determination, that is to say, the aspiration to equal recognition and differentiated equalities. The case of the indigenous peoples is paramount in this regard. Even though all cultures are relative, relativism is wrong as a philosophical stance. It is therefore imperative to develop (transcultural?) criteria to distinguish emancipatory from retrogressive forms of multiculturalism or self-determination.

The aspiration to multiculturalism and self-determination often takes the social form of a struggle for justice and citizenship. It involves the claims for alternative forms of law and justice and for new regimes of citizenship. The plurality of legal orders, which has become more visible with the crisis of the nation-state, carries with it, either implicitly or explicitly, the idea of multiple citizenships coexisting in the same geopolitical field and, hence, the idea of the existence of first-, second- and third-class citizens. However, non-state legal orders may also be the embryo of non-state public spheres and the institutional base for self-determination, as in the case of indigenous justice: forms of community, informal, local, popular justice that are part and parcel of struggles or initiatives pertaining to any of the three above-mentioned themes. For instance, community or popular justice as an integral component of participatory democracy initiatives; Indigenous justice as an integral component of self-determination or conservation of biodiversity. The concept of ‘multicultural citizenship’ (Kymlicka, 1995) is the privileged site upon which to ground the kind of mutual implication of redistribution and recognition I am advocating in this article.

4. Biodiversity, Rival Knowledges and Intellectual Property Rights. Due to the advancement of the last decades in the life sciences, biotechnology and microelectronics, biodiversity has become one of the most precious and sought after ‘natural resources’. For biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, biodiversity appears increasingly at the core of the most spectacular and thus profitable product developments in the years ahead. By and large, biodiversity occurs mainly in the so-called Third World and predominantly in territories historically owned or long occupied by indigenous peoples. While technologically advanced countries seek to extend intellectual property rights and patent law to biodiversity, some peripheral countries, indigenous peoples’ groups and transnational advocacy networks on their behalf are seeking to guarantee the conservation and
reproduction of biodiversity by granting special protected status to the territories, ways of life and traditional knowledges of indigenous and peasant communities. It is increasingly evident that the new cleavages between the North and the South will be centered around the question of access to biodiversity on a global scale.

Though all the above-mentioned themes raise an epistemological issue, to the extent that they claim the validity of knowledges that have been discarded by hegemonic scientific knowledge, biodiversity is probably the topic in which the clash between rival knowledges is more evident and eventually more unequal and violent. Here equality and difference are the building blocks on new mestiza epistemological claims.

5. New Labor Internationalism. As is well known labor internationalism was one of the most blatantly unfulfilled predictions of the Communist Manifesto. Capital globalized itself, not the labor movement. The labor movement organized itself at the national level and, at least in the core countries, became increasingly dependent upon the welfare state. It is true that in our century international links and organizations have kept alive the idea of labor internationalism, but they became prey to the Cold War and their fate followed the fate of the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War period, and as a response to the more aggressive bouts of hegemonic globalization, new and as yet very precarious forms of labor internationalism have emerged: the debate on labor standards; exchanges, agreements or even institutional congregation among labor unions of different countries integrated in the same economic regional bloc (NAFTA, European Union, Mercosul); articulation among struggles, claims and demands of the different labor unions representing the workers working for the same multinational corporation in different countries, etc.

Even more directly than alternative-production systems, the new labor internationalism confronts the logic of global capitalism on its own privileged ground: the economy. Its success is dependent upon the ‘extra-economic’ linkages it will be able to build with the struggles clustered around all the other four themes. Such linkages will be crucial to transform the politics of equality that dominated the old labor internationalism into a new political and cultural mix of equality and difference.

None of these themes or thematic initiatives taken separately will succeed in bringing about transnational emancipatory sub-politics or counter-hegemonic globalization. To be successful their emancipatory concerns must undergo translation and networking, expanding in ever more socially hybrid but politically focused movements. In a nutshell, what is at stake in political terms at the beginning of the century is the reinvention of the state and of civil society in such a way that societal fascism will vanish as a possible future. This is to be accomplished through the proliferation of local/global public spheres in which nation-states are important partners but not exclusive dispensers of either legitimacy or hegemony.
Conclusion: Which Side are You On, Ariel?

Starting from an analysis of Nuestra America as the subaltern view of the American continent throughout the 20th century, I identified Nuestra America’s counter-hegemonic potential and indicated some of the reasons why it failed to fulfill itself. Revisiting the historical trajectory of Nuestra America and its cultural conscience, the baroque ethos, and proceeding on that basis, I then reconstructed the forms of sociability and subjectivity that might be interested in and capable of confronting the challenges posed by counter-hegemonic globalizations. The symbolic expansion made possible by a metaphorical interpretation of Nuestra America permits us to view the latter as the blueprint of the new transnational political culture called for in the new century and millennium. The normative claims of this political culture are embedded in the lived experiences of the people for whom Nuestra America speaks. Such claims, however embryonic and interstitial, point to a new kind of ‘natural law’ – a situated, contextualized, postcolonial, multicultural, bottom-up, cosmopolitan law.

The fact that the five themes selected as testing grounds and playing fields of the new political culture have deep roots in Latin America justifies, from an historical and political point of view, the symbolic expansion of the idea of Nuestra America proposed in this article. However, in order not to repeat the frustrations of the last century, this symbolic expansion must go one step further and include the most neglected trope in the Nuestra America mythos: Ariel, the spirit of air in Shakespeare’s The Tempest. Like Caliban, Ariel is Prospero’s slave. However, besides not being deformed like Caliban, he gets much better treatment from Prospero, who promises him freedom if he serves Prospero faithfully. As we have seen, Nuestra America has looked upon itself predominantly as Caliban in constant and unequal struggle against Prospero. This is how Andrade, Aimé Césaire, Edward Braithwaite, George Lamming, Retamar and many others see it (Retamar, 1989: 13). While this is the dominant vision, it is not the only one. For instance, in 1898 the Franco-Argentinian writer Paul Groussac spoke of the need to defend the old European and Latin American civilization against the ‘Calibanesque Yankee’ (Retamar, 1989: 10). On the other hand, the ambiguous figure of Ariel inspired several interpretations. In 1900, the writer José Enrique Rodó published his own Ariel, in which he identifies Latin America with Ariel, while implicitly North America gets identified with Caliban. In 1935, the Argentine Aníbal Ponce saw in Ariel the intellectual, tied to Prospero in a less brutal way than Caliban, but nonetheless at his service, much according to the model that Renaissance humanism conceived for the intellectuals: a mixture of slave and mercenary, indifferent to action and conformist vis-à-vis the established order (Retamar, 1989: 12). This is the intellectual Ariel reinvented by Aimé Césaire in his play of the late 1960s: Une tempête: adaptation de ‘La Tempête’ de Shakespeare pour un théâtre nègre. Now turned into a mulatto, Ariel is the intellectual permanently in crisis.
This said, I suggest it is high time we give a new symbolic identification to Ariel and ascertain of what use he can be for the promotion of the emancipatory ideal of Nuestra America. I shall conclude, therefore, by presenting Ariel as a baroque angel undergoing three transfigurations.

His first transfiguration is Césaire’s mulatto Ariel. Against racism and xenophobia, Ariel represents transculturation and multiculturalism, mestizaje of flesh and spirit, as Darcy Ribeiro would say. In this mestizaje the possibility of interracial tolerance and intercultural dialogue is inscribed. The mulatto Ariel is the metaphor of a possible synthesis between recognition and equality.

Ariel’s second transfiguration is Gramsci’s intellectual, who exercises self-reflexivity in order to know on whose side he is and what use he can be. This Ariel is unequivocally on the side of Caliban, on the side of all the oppressed peoples and groups of the world, and keeps a constant epistemological and political vigilance on himself lest his help becomes useless or even counterproductive. This Ariel is an intellectual trained in Martí’s university.

The third and last transfiguration is more complex. As a mulatto and an organic intellectual, Arial is a figure of intermediation. In spite of the most recent transformations of the world economy, I still think that there are countries (or regions, sectors) of intermediary development which perform the function of intermediation between the core and the periphery of the world system. Particularly important in this regard are countries like Brazil, Mexico, and India. The first two countries only came to recognize their multicultural and pluri-ethnic characters at the end of the 20th century. Such recognition came at the end of a painful historical process in the course of which the suppression of difference (for example, in Brazil ‘racial democracy’ and in Mexico ‘assimilationism’ and the mestizo as the ‘raza cosmica’), rather than opening up the space for republican equality, led to the most abject forms of inequality. Just like the Ariel of Shakespeare’s play, rather than uniting amongst themselves and with many others coming from Caliban-countries, these intermediation countries have been using their economic and populational weight to try to gain privileged treatment from Prospero. They act in isolation hoping to maximize their possibilities of success alone.

As I have argued in this article, the potential of their populations for engaging in transnational emancipatory sub-politics and thus in counter-hegemonic globalizations depends upon their capacity to transfigure themselves into an Ariel unequivocally solidary with Caliban. In this symbolic transfiguration resides the most important political task of the next decades. On them depends the possibility of a second century of Nuestra America with greater success than the first one.

Notes
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1. On the relations between the Pope and the feudal lords concerning the Crusades, see Gibbon (1928, vol. 6: 31).
2. From very different perspectives Robertson (1992); Escobar (1995); Castells (1996); Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996); Mander and Goldsmith (1996); Ritzer (1996); Chossudovsky (1997); Bauman (1998); Arrighi and Silver (1999); Jameson and Miyoshi (1999) converge on this.
3. A brilliant exception is Montaigne’s essay on ‘The Cannibals’ (1958), written at the very beginning of Eurocentric modernity.
4. The baroque ethos I propound here is very different from Lash’s ‘Baroque melancholy’ (1999: 330). Our differences are due in part to the different loci of the baroque we base our analysis on, Europe in the case of Lash, Latin America in my case.
5. Among others see Alberro (1992); Pastor et al. (1993). With reference to Brazilian baroque Coutinho (1990: 16) speaks of ‘a complex baroque mestizajem’. Cf. also the concept of the ‘Black Atlantic’ (Gilroy, 1993) to express the mestizaje that characterizes black cultural experience, an experience that is not specifically African, American, Caribbean or British, but all of them at one and the same time. In the Portuguese-speaking world, the Anthropophagous Manifesto of Oswald de Andrade remains the most striking exemplar of mestizaje.
6. On the baroque feast in Mexico see Leon (1993), and in Brazil (Minas Gerais) see Ávila (1994). The relationship between the feast, particularly the baroque feast, and utopian thinking remains to be explored. On the relationship between fouriérisme and la société festive, see Desroche (1975).
7. Ávila concurs, stressing the mixture of religious and heathen motifs: ‘Amongst hordes of negroes playing bagpipes, drums, fifes and trumpets, there would be, for example, an excellent German “impersonator” tearing apart the silence of the air with the loud sound of a clarinet, while the believers devoutly carried religious banners or images’ (1994: 56).
8. I studied participatory budgeting in the city of Porto Alegre (Santos, 1998c).

References


